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Introduction. 
 
Despite the relevance of large firms’ contribution to R&D and innovation, last decades changes in 
economic activity have come mainly from small firms that interrelate knowledge and abilities to go into 
business (Holmstrom, 1989). These two contrasting models present features that have been largely 
studied.  The big and vertically integrated firms consolidate all the activities involved in either the 
productive line or the value chain in centralized structures (Williamson, 2002).  These structures 
concentrate power and decision taking processes in top tier levels, leaving to lower level employees 
scarce freedom to perform their activities (Faldetta, 2002).    Firms that interrelate activities among each 
other are also known as network based firms, because their production process and outcomes turn up by 
their interaction within a network.  These networks are formed by a number of SMEs, and their 
advantages have been studied in terms of complementarities, knowledge and learning synergies that foster 
innovation capabilities (Saxenian, 1994).  These two models share the similarity that they are goal 
oriented, they are intended to produce and market goods in an efficient way either integrating activities or 
signing alliances with partners. 
 
In recent times, scientific research has devoted attention to open source software industry (Lerner 
and Tirole, 2001; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Bonaccorsi e Rossi, 2003, among many other), 
characterized by an asynchronous network of skilled programmers that share software and their 
algorithms to perform a specialized function. It can be defined as a proto-model of organization that is 
also based in interrelations but among individuals. These interrelations constitute the main form to 
accumulate expertise through contribution of network members, but their purpose is essentially different.   
Professionals develop a software program whose algorithm or code is available for everyone.  Software 
and code can be either freely downloadable or users need to pay a fee for them. In any case, the code 
procurement allows other programmers to understand how software is made, and to build up new features 
or fix programming flaws. 
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Although the knowledge base is the same, open source software industry seems different from 
software industry.  Firms in software industry develop software programs inside their vertically integrated 
structures. Through integration they can assure their products meet upstream and downstream standards’ 
compatibility requirements (Richardson, 1997).  Users only can have access to software through a 
licensing fee, but never get access to the code. 
 
Internet represents one of the main drivers of open source software increasing relevance (Healy, 
2002).   Apache server, an open source code product, supports most of Internet transactions.  Many of the 
web pages hosted are also open source code.  Moreover, the increased flexibility in programming of open 
source products has expanded the skilled users base, resembling a threat to vertically integrated software 
companies.  These changes have leaded big firms start to produce open source code products (Parloff, 
2004). 
 
Oppositely, open source programmers are facing the opportunity to supply these products to non-
expert consumers in the mass market.  Unskilled consumers need to have friendlier versions that perfectly 
fit into their hardware.  Thus, programmers started to constitute firms that provide complementary 
services to their actual open code solutions.  These two contrary movements give the impression of 
convergence in an intermediate set up, that deserves to be analyzed through organizational and economic 
theories. 
 
From an organizational perspective, the focus of this research is not on networks of firms, whose 
cooperative agreements act as substitutes of either market based relationships or ownership coordination. 
In contrast, its main focus is relationships different to social and contractual ties, which exist among 
individuals jointly developing an uncertain product. How individuals take decisions to allocate resources 
to product development. How their contributions promote the evolution of knowledge base and strengthen 
the core capabilities of the virtual organization.  How environmental, market and economic conditions 
sow the ground to the emergence of a new organizational sub-field that should interact with large firms 
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and single individuals interests. And how intellectual property rights may constitute themselves a strategy 
to exert control over innovation and contribute to the model sustainability. 
 
The present work issues introduced above tested in a network of Open Source Software. In 
Section I, I present a study on the direction of knowledge exchanges how affects the success of a project. 
Section III, presents a study about the determinants for contribution in open source projects, where I 
assess for the effects of the main theoretical explanations and suggests some more. In Section IV, I 
introduce a study about the effects of quality of productive assets as the determinants for organizational 
reputation. Section V concludes with final comments.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Open Source Software (OSS) movement has recently received an enormous amount 
of attention as the OSS development process, product commercialisation, and diffusion differ 
dramatically from those of proprietary software solutions. Individual programmers contribute to 
the development of core tasks, the debugging, and the improvement of programs until they are 
finished for different reasons (Raymond, 1999): First, self-interested behaviour – programmers 
need the software and its improvements for their own purposes- and, alternatively, expectations 
from reciprocity (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Bergquist and Ljungberg, 2001; DiBona et al., 1999; 
Kollock, 1994); Second, reputation, and associated rents gained by those who make high quality 
contributions (Lerner and Tirole, 2001 and 2002; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005); Third, philanthropic 
behaviour linked to the enjoyment of the contribution itself (Raymond, 1999).  
Current research on OSS focuses on the mechanisms and foundations underlying the 
network formation since they represent a valuable setting for understanding basic aspects of 
social organisation, such as cooperation, and the emergence of open networks as enduring forms 
of governance (Lakhani and Von Hippel, 2003). In OSS networks, cooperation takes place 
among a large, heterogeneous and ever changing number of developers working simultaneously 
on different projects where, typically, participants are strangers and, there are no long-term 
commitments[1]. However, without active contribution and participation, collaborative 
knowledge will not succeed. The OSS gains prominence as projects, independently of their 
domain and scale, organised according to the principles of a community of practice (Brown and 
Duguid, 1991): open and self-organising networks in which shared values, norms and beliefs rest 
upon generalised exchange mechanisms and expectations of reciprocity. Then, pure generalised 
exchange might emerge in the presence of altruism, a collective sense of fairness that allows for 
unilateral giving while preventing free riding behaviour (Ekeh, 1974), and whenever gift givers 
may choose the recipients (‘fairness-based selective giving’) (Takahashi, 2000) [2]. This strategy 
materialises as a strong reason why individuals freely reveal innovation-related information 
within innovation communities (Franke and Shah, 2002). 
                                                 
1 Programmers are geographically distant; they come from different cultures, languages, traditions and differ in 
personal, professional and social features. 
2 The fairness-based selective strategy is characterized by actors endowed with options for leaving the current 
relation and forming a new relation […] but it cannot really explain generalized exchange patterns when actors are 
strangers (Takahashi, 2000). 
 9 
From an empirical perspective, at least three questions stand out: First, why individuals 
participate in generalised exchange mechanisms in the absence of hierarchical structures and 
rules [3]: a refined understanding of the mechanisms governing exchange relationships between 
community members (fairness, trust, generalised and reciprocal exchange); Second, the relative 
importance of skill level versus other relationships in determining an individual position in the 
network; Third, the differences in the emergence of collaborative structure types and their 
relation to the success of open source projects.  
This paper addresses how differences in collaborative structures influence open source 
projects’ success using a panel data of 2,962 software game projects from SourceForge.net. Our 
data allow us to identify flows of knowledge and information among projects and the 
collaborative structures emerging based on software developers’ contributions working on those 
projects.  
The architecture of network ties and of interpersonal relations will differ among projects 
as a result of the projects’ heterogeneity in both human and social capital. Programmer skills and 
knowledge refer to human capital while the capabilities to access resources embedded in their 
social and professional networks are termed as social capital. Programmers working across 
different projects may have a wide network of relationships favouring knowledge and 
information flows and affecting the projects’ differential success rates. Previous research on 
social capital and networks indicates that strong ties, while providing relational benefits, are less 
likely to provide non-redundant knowledge. Moreover, projects requiring the reception of mostly 
explicit knowledge, as is the case of OSS, benefit from having a network of weak ties 
(Granovetter, 1973; Hansen, 1999) while avoiding the costs of developing trustworthy 
collaborations, or by exploiting access to unique resources (Burt, 1992). However, open source 
projects may also benefit from knowledge sharing outside their boundaries, as previous research 
has shown in the case of work groups (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992). In such a context, work 
groups’ structural diversity contributes to strong effects on performance associated with 
knowledge sharing. A structurally diverse work group is one in which the members, by virtue of 
their different organisational affiliations, roles, or positions, can expose the group to unique 
sources of knowledge (Cummings, 2004). 
The OSS projects’ collaborative structure is based on knowledge sharing defined here as 
the provision or reception of information, expertise, and feedback regarding the development 
                                                 
3 Unilateral resource giving within social and economic exchanges may emerge because of: (1) pure altruistic 
behaviour; (2) collective norms that punish any form of free riding, and (3) rational choice under game theoretical 
frameworks in which the existence of incentive structures to solve social dilemmas predominates (Olson, 1965). 
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and/or modification of a source code. Consequently, open source knowledge sharing represents a 
generalised exchange supported by the expectation that if a community member provides 
assistance today (provision), someone else will provide him with assistance when he needs it 
(reception). However, research on generalised exchange is more concerned about free-riding 
issues and individual behaviour/incentives than the structural characteristics of work groups and 
its effects on success.  
Our analysis focuses on the effects of knowledge sharing on projects performance 
accounting from the effects of both knowledge/information reception and provision. 
Consequently, the research questions addressed are: (1) Does a focal project that receives 
knowledge from other actors improves its performance? (2) Are these effects comparable to 
those obtained from providing knowledge to other actors? In addition (3) what are the effects on 
performance of a focal project where its members engage in generalised exchange towards other 
projects? To answer those questions we base ourselves on social capital theories and on groups’ 
structural diversity. 
In this paper we consider social capital as the ties between programmers that provide 
access to information and, consequently, between projects on which they work. However, there 
is empirical evidence to suggest that the nature of ties explains additional variance in outcomes 
beyond that explained by structure alone (Lin 1999). While research on social capital and social 
networks has emphasised the strong/weak nature of those ties, we account for the directionality 
of knowledge flows –inwards and outwards- with respect to a focal project as a structural 
dimension of diversity since they relate to the role performed by individual programmers in 
different projects.  
We use the project as the unit of analysis; each project represents an event and 
programmers or actors relate to each other through events, and events relate to other events 
because of common actors. Though the data analyzed represents a two-mode affiliation networks 
(Waserman and Faust, 1994; Faust, 1997), our theoretical analysis and modelling depart from 
previous works; we project a two-mode network into a one-mode event by event network 
(Sorenson and Stuart, 2008). The modelling of events/projects collaborative structure also 
introduces some attributes of the actors/programmers on whom the ties form.  
Our analysis indicates that knowledge flows among projects are asymmetric as result of 
both members and contributors’ role. We found that connections through contributors who bring 
their programming expertise inbound the project, besides being a source of new knowledge, 
improve project success. Additionally, our findings reveal that connections through members 
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who sign up in other projects hinder the focal project success, unless they carry on programming 
activities transferring their knowledge towards other projects. Finally, we found that ties through 
shared membership and contribution hamper project success. 
This paper presents our analysis as follows. First, we introduce the theoretical 
framework. In section 3, we present the data and variables used, and in section 4, we show the 
main results. Finally, we conclude by discussing the findings, limitations and further research 
implications. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
 
Previous studies on large OSS projects such as Linux and Apache support the presence of 
social capital (Bergquist and Ljunberg, 2001; McKelvey, 2001): as big projects nurture 
themselves from individual contributions, thus the overall effect is straight forward as soon as 
they capture new contributors. More recently, empirical evidence suggests that social capital, 
measured by the density of ties, positively influences collective activity and productivity (Long, 
2006). When referring to OSS networks, Zhang (2007) identifies previous ties among a group of 
programmers as a powerful predictor of further members’ affiliation to specific projects. The 
existence and density of prior ties between the initiator of the project and developers positively 
influence the probability of a project to attract more individuals. Consequently, in an analogous 
idea to Putnam’s (1995), in OSS networks social capital seems likely to be a substitute for the 
absence of organisational structures and hierarchical authority devoted to promoting 
communication, coordination, resource pooling and knowledge sharing, and contributing to 
improving efficiency and performance.  
External knowledge in the open network and the inflow of ideas comes through 
programmers involved in two or more projects. While programmers differ in their skills, they 
also differ in their access to resources embedded in their social and professional networks, and 
those differences are critical in the success of OSS projects.  
Social capital entails the underlying structure for exchange, where relations among 
individuals create and support a common understanding that promotes the generation of a public 
good exploitable by all individuals within the structure (Coleman, 1988). Social capital is rooted 
in ties among agents that exchange information and provide access to resources leading to a 
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major emphasis on the density of connections and centrality (Ahuja, 2000; Zajac and Westphal, 
1996).  
Research on social networks has an established and long tradition in social disciplines 
because of both interest in patterns of exchange and the important implications of networks in 
the spread of information and knowledge (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973; Larson, 1992; Powell, 
1990; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Zajac and Westphal, 1996).  
Scholars interpret social capital as a metaphor about the gains individuals or groups may 
obtain by belonging and interacting in social network structures. The result is an increasing and 
dense body of literature that uses social capital as an independent variable to explain a wide 
range of social phenomena concluding that individuals or firms interacting within a network 
perform better than when they are alone (Burt, 2000). The structural dimension of social capital 
emphasises some network properties including the strength of ties (Granovetter, 1973), structural 
holes (Burt, 1992) and embeddedness (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Direct ties define strong 
interactions among projects –throughout their programmers- representing channels for the 
transfer of useful knowledge (Uzzi, 1996 and 1997; Levin and Cross, 2004). The definition of 
indirect or weak ties establishes that distant and infrequent interactions play an instrumental role 
on the diffusion of ideas and information (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). Hence, 
prior studies found that knowledge sharing positively relates to factors such as strong [intra-
group] ties (Wellman and Wortley 1990), co-location (Allen 1977), demographic similarity 
(Pelled 1996), status similarity (Cohen and Zhou 1991), and a history of prior relationships 
(Krackhardt 1992). 
These ties differ in their effects on knowledge sharing; direct/strong ties based on trust 
enhance the transfer of both tacit and explicit knowledge while indirect/weak ties allow the 
transfer of codified knowledge more efficiently (Hansen, 1999; Ahuja, 2000). Previous research 
indicates that strong ties, while providing relational benefits, are less likely to provide non-
redundant knowledge. Moreover, projects requiring the receipt of mostly explicit knowledge, as 
is the case of OSS, benefit from having a network of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973; Hansen, 
1999) while avoiding the costs of developing trustworthy collaborations, or by exploiting access 
to unique resources (Burt, 1992).  
Social capital benefits are the return to investment strategies oriented to institutionalising 
group relations into a social network. Portes (1998) considers a socio-relational dimension of 
social capital where agents gain access to resources, and a stock dimension comprising the 
quantity and quality of those resources. OSS projects reflect a common stock of knowledge. 
 13 
Software projects in general and OSS projects in particular, exhibit at least two properties: (1) 
they have a modular architecture and (2) outcomes may vary along the design process allowing 
the introduction of new modules and creating an option value for development. These two 
properties suggest that projects themselves become a stock of social capital supplied and 
nurtured by members and contributors.  
This paper deals with the value of [external] knowledge sharing and its effects on OSS 
projects’ success. Knowledge sharing is defined here as the provision or reception of 
information, expertise, and feedback regarding the development and/or modification of a source 
code. Thus, we expect that flows of knowledge incoming to a focal project will contribute to its 
stock of social capital and its success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Knowledge sharing will positively influence a focal project’s success 
while the effects of reception will be stronger than the effects of provision.  
 
However, instead of focusing on the strength of ties - the closeness and frequency of 
interactions in a dyadic  relationship- and structural embeddedness (Grewal et al., 2006) we 
focus on  the groups’ structural diversity. Cummings (2004) has hypothesised that external 
knowledge sharing will be more strongly associated with performance when work groups are 
more structurally diverse. A structurally diverse work group is one in which the members, 
depending on their different organisational affiliations, roles, or positions, can expose the group 
to unique sources of knowledge. Structural diversity within OSS projects refers to differential 
access to external sources of knowledge by virtue of programmers’ affiliations and roles. 
Although structural diversity may also relate to previous collaborative experiences and expertise, 
we do not deal with this issue here.  
Thus, we expect OSS projects’ members to have a differential impact on project success 
accordingly to their role, function and their social network.  For the purpose of this paper, we 
label the team workforce appointed by the project leader as members of the project; these 
members of the project may perform different activities, from project administrator to language 
translator. We denote all persons who contribute to software development as contributors; 
though not all members of the project are contributors and not all contributors are members of 
the project. However, some of them are members and contributors at the same time. 
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Since knowledge sharing includes the provision and the reception of information, the 
effects will be stronger if programmers gain unique insight on both projects (i.e. contributor-
contributor). Then, 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. External knowledge sharing among projects through individuals 
contributing to software development in more than one project, will positively influence [a focal] 
project success. 
 
Projects with individuals representing different functions (i.e. contributors or members) 
can access diverse social networks they have established in their respective domains and have an 
effect on a focal project’s success from the perspective of social capital. Therefore, we do not 
expect those gains to differ when individuals in a focal project represent a dual role 
(contributor/member).  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. External knowledge sharing among projects through members 
contributing to software development in other projects will positively influence the focal project 
success independently of the type of role they play in the focal project. 
 
Woolcock (1998) classified ties as bridging, bonding, and linking social capital. Bridging 
refers to relations between more distant and heterogeneous members; bonding indicates higher 
levels of homogeneity, while linking relates to the ability to leverage resources and information 
beyond the community. We identify ‘bonding’ ties among OSS projects when members 
contribute to more than one project since they imply higher levels of knowledge homogeneity. 
On the other hand, we consider that the relationships between a focal project member/contributor 
who is solely a member in other projects represent ‘bridging’ ties. Knowledge homogeneity will 
result in lower effects on project performance because of a lack of access to new knowledge 
resources, and 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4. External knowledge sharing among projects through members 
contributing to software development in the focal project and other projects will have a lower 
effect on the focal project’s success than when members contributing to the focal project are sole 
members of other projects. 
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The analysis of interaction among projects becomes relevant as the emergence of the 
OSS movement leads to the creation of repositories for software development. Repositories 
usually are internet-based sites that provide an organisational infrastructure to allow 
asynchronous exchanges among programmers, mobilise contribution of people otherwise hard to 
reach, and screen the contributions from redundant knowledge. A repository integrates a 
community that benefits from the exchange of knowledge among its members. 
If repositories track all artifacts and records, we can identify who are contributors and 
who are just members of the project. Moreover, we can identify if an individual who is a 
member of a particular project is simultaneously a member of another project. Thus, depending 
on the affiliation and the  role played by individuals somehow involved in the development in 
each project, the social network for knowledge exchange within the repository comprises nine 
forms of ties among each pair of projects: ‘member-member’, ‘contributor-member’, ‘member-
contributor’, ‘contributor-contributor’, ‘duality-member’, ‘duality-contributor’, ‘member-
duality’, ‘contributor-duality’ and ‘duality-duality’. 
The suitability of OSS repositories for identifying the structural dimension of interactions 
comes from the structure that a repository provides through knowledge exchange. OSS 
programmers interact by contributing their knowledge to their own and others’ projects but they 
do not necessarily receive the same amount or quality of contributions from other network 
actors: yet they generate expectations about others’ behaviour for providing their knowledge. 
Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the knowledge flows throughout the community and their 
communication paths that sustain and reinforce social capital. 
The present study contributes to social capital theory and its empirical analysis in several 
ways. First, we claim there are different individual strategies for investing in social capital, and 
these strategies have a relation to structural diversity (role and affiliation). Secondly, we support 
the fact that social capital influences project’s success only if contributors provide new valuable 
knowledge whether inside or outside the focal project. 
 
3. Data and analysis 
The analysis of social capital in OSS repositories requires a thorough database that on 
one hand, provides intricate details of project formation, organisation and operation, and on the 
other hand, provides details about the implication of individuals in the software development. 
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Furthermore, the analysis itself requires disentangling the relationships occurring through the 
social network. 
3.1. Data setting 
The data we use in this analysis come from the SourceForge.net Research Data 
(Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Notre Dame). 
SourceForge.net is the largest repository of open source software; it hosts over 140,000 projects 
and gathers over 1.5 million registered users. SourceForge.net belongs to OSTG, Inc, which has 
shared activity data with the University of Notre Dame for the purpose of academic research on 
OSS, under the condition of sharing the data further with other researchers interested in open 
source software phenomenon (Christley and Madey, 2005). 
Sourceforge.net as a repository has several characteristics that promote network 
exchanges. The purpose of the repository is to provide a platform for software development over 
a worldwide web infrastructure for knowledge exchange. They host projects and provide tools 
that allow asynchronous communication, stock people’s contribution, and screen software for 
redundant knowledge. To host a project, an initiator should register in the network; and post a 
message to the platform indicating the type of software, its purpose and target public, the 
intellectual property regime, the programming language, the user interface, the phase of 
development and the team workforce that will be responsible for developing and controlling the 
software. Then Sourceforge.net administrators authorise the creation of a space for hosting the 
project if it satisfies the main premises for the repository. Once the repository hosts the project, 
then it registers and controls all its activity. Every time there is a movement in the project, the 
repository electronically archives the information; these movements may include 
communications among members, forum posts, and more importantly, the artifacts –or modules 
of software code, produced by the people engaged in programming activities. As an important 
feature of a repository is to open access to projects to everybody on the worldwide web, every 
single person, registered or not on Sourceforge.net, may see the project, look at the code, and 
contribute. The repository records changes in the team workforce, so it is possible to know if 
there are new members or if some of them have already quitted the project. As repository tracks 
all artifacts records, we can identify who are contributors, who are members, and who play the 
duality at each project. Hence, we can observe how projects connect within the repository 
through individuals. These individuals establish a tie among the available pool of knowledge for 
each project. 
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Particularly, our dataset is a sub-sample of 2,962 valid observations over twelve months 
of projects aimed at developing game software. To get this sample, we look at the monthly 
dumps of data and select all projects that belong to the category of GNU Public License (GPL) 
[4].  We restrict the sample to such a license to guarantee that projects were not subject to any 
restriction for copying, adoption and distribution, so all software is equally prone to reach the 
same audience. Then, we limit the sample to games in a general category. This selection serves 
the purpose of tapping an appropriate measure of project success. Although we will further 
discuss performance and success measures, we should advance that we are interested in 
measuring performance as market penetration of software; thus, we should pick a category of 
projects whose target markets were not constrained by the programming skills and abilities of 
end users. Furthermore, we restrict the sample for the projects that were alive during the whole 
sample; we take this decision because dataset classifies a project as ‘alive’ –when the repository 
still hosts the project and ‘dead’ when they quit the repository. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
distinguish if the project has quitted the repository because it went independently, or moved to 
another repository, or just ended; thus, their disappearance does not necessarily relate to market 
demands, or product lifecycles, but to managerial premises. Finally, we look at those projects 
whose information on downloading activity is available. As the source of information comes 
from relational database, some observations could be missing in the joining process. We follow 
this procedure over twelve months running from February 2005 to January 2006, to build an 
unbalanced panel with 25,722 total observations. 
3.2 Variables and analysis 
Dependent Variable. Project success. 
We present project success as a dependent variable; for that we use number of downloads 
per month as a measure of project success. A download means one user retrieves the executable 
files of the software for her private use; thus downloads are an output measure of success or 
popularity among a mass of users. Number of downloads is consistent with the nature of a 
software game as a digital good through Internet, because downloading is the sole way to access 
it; furthermore, it is a common measure of performance in OSS (Crowston et al, 2003; Grewal et 
al., 2006). 
 
                                                 
4 GPL grants the programmers and users of software the privileges or freedom to distribute and modify copies of the 
software, and transfers those privileges to further developments. 
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Independent Variable. Social network as a source of social capital. 
Social capital measures are largely heterogeneous within academic literature, thus they 
vary as they refer to different social capital perspectives [5].In this paper our measure of social 
capital lies in the structure of knowledge flows and refers to the sum of [complementary] 
resources attainable through a social network of projects that include both unidirectional and 
bidirectional relations. In our analysis, we test whether direction in knowledge flows in the social 
network of projects generate different outcomes in terms of the projects’ success.  
Here we measure directionality of ties among projects through identifying roles and 
affiliations, that is, contributors, members and duality roles. The presence of such ties indicates 
knowledge flows that enhance performance of the focal project.  
We focus on dyadic relationships since they represent ties between pairs of projects 
linked through at least one of their members, or contributors. Nonetheless, if projects share more 
than one individual we count just one tie if they are the same typology of relationships. In doing 
so, we are measuring the relevance of structural diversity instead of the density of relationships.  
This practice also helps to diminish a plausible effect of excess downloading just for having 
more individuals involved in both projects simultaneously. For example, if the number of 
individual programmers from project A contributing to project B is three, it counts as one tie 
between projects A and B.  Thus, our measure for ties attempts to equate a linkage between the 
knowledge of the focal project and the knowledge of any other project within the 
SourceForge.net. 
However, the important feature we want to test is the effect of knowledge flow direction 
on project success. We distinguish between those ties that receive inbound knowledge –or ties 
through individuals who play the ‘contributor’ or a ‘duality’ role in the focal project, from those 
ties, which provide outbound knowledge to other projects. All categories of ties measure 
knowledge flows from the focal project’s point of view, therefore, although above we define 
nine forms of ties we can group those that represent the same directions of knowledge sharing 
for the focal project. In addition, we observe that a tie through individuals who simultaneously 
play as members and contributors in both projects does not actually represent a share of 
knowledge, but the common stock of knowledge for both projects, and thus we disregard this 
category.   The independent variables are:  
                                                 
5 For example, in Putnam’s tradition, social capital measures membership in voluntary organizations as an indicator 
of networks together with norms and social trust (Putnam, 1995; Tsai and Goshal, 1998). In Granovetter’s and 
Burt’s tradition, social capital measures, to some extent, the information flows through exchanges among partners 
(Glaeser et al, 2000; Koka and Prescott 2002; Oh et al, 2004). 
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 (1) Active-inbound ties: We consider the reception of knowledge from other projects 
toward focal project; nonetheless, other projects receive some share of knowledge. That means 
ties through non-members individuals that contribute to a focal project, and simultaneously 
contribute to other projects. It measures focal project ties through the forms ‘contributor-
contributor’ and ‘contributor-duality’. 
 (2) Inactive-inbound ties: We consider the reception of knowledge from other projects 
toward the focal project, but other projects do not receive any share of knowledge. It means ties 
through contributors to focal projects that are sole members in other projects. They measure 
focal project ties through the form ‘contributor-member’. 
(2) Active-outbound ties: We consider the provision of knowledge from the focal project 
toward other projects. It means ties through individuals members of the focal project that 
actively contribute to other projects. They measure focal project ties through the forms ‘member-
contributor’ and ‘member-dual’ roles. 
(4) Inactive-outbound ties: We consider potential knowledge flow for both focal and 
other projects, but none of them actually receives a share of knowledge. It means ties from 
individuals that are sole members in both focal and other projects. They measure focal project 
ties through the form ‘member-member’. 
 (5) Duality-inbound ties: We consider the reception of knowledge from other projects 
toward the focal project, where individuals play a duality role and other projects do not receive 
any share of knowledge. It means ties through individuals that play a dual role as members and 
contributors in a focal project and are sole members in another. They indicate focal project ties 
through the form of ‘duality-member’ ties. 
(6) Duality-outbound ties: We consider the provision of knowledge flow from the focal 
project, where individuals play a duality role while other projects receive some share of 
knowledge. It means ties through individuals that play a duality role as members and 
contributors in a focal project and contributors in another. They indicate focal project ties 
through the form of ‘duality-contributor’ ties. 
Control variables 
In the present study, we have included the project’s characteristics such as control 
variables. On one hand, these control variables reflect the characteristics, which may induce 
differences in dependent variable because of demographic issues, such as size and age of a 
project; but also those referring to their technical peculiarities, which could demand an increase 
in knowledge transfer.  Our control variables include:   
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(1) Project SIZE: Number of members of focal project. 
(2) Project AGE: Age of the project in days. 
(3) STAGE: OSS projects included in our database are at different stages of development, 
going from planning, pre-alpha, alpha, beta, production, mature and inactive. The status of the 
project and its ability to attract programmers, and therefore the number of ties and contributions 
from outside, are strongly associated. At its first stage, the core process is the creation of an 
initial system that will evolve over time. At the last stages, the core process is the diffusion of the 
product. Thus, we controlled for the evolution as the project may require different knowledge 
along its stages. 
(4) Characteristics: We controlled for characteristics such as programming language, 
operating system, user interface, intended audience, and speaking language of the game. 
(5) Previous project success: We control for the number of downloads at the previous 
period to take into account the possibility that successful projects attract the attention of more 
programmers. This is lagged dependent variable. 
 
In order to test our hypotheses on a dynamic approach, we use a differences-in-
differences fixed effects estimator; that is taking differences in both dependent and independent 
variables on a monthly basis. Therefore, we condition a variation in success at month t+1 with 
respect to month t, to a variation on ties at month t+1with respect to month t, controlling for the 
project’s fixed effects over the period of study. We want to measure how a variation on a pattern 
of knowledge flows influences the monthly rate of downloading. The use of this type of 
regression method obeys our intention of testing how differential rates of knowledge exchange 
strategies condition project success. A variation in a particular type of tie means there is 
knowledge flow from or toward a different project, such as discovering a new source of 
knowledge, or a new channel for diffusion. The fixed effect estimator allows us to isolate the 
effect of a particular project, whose characteristics make it more attractive for programmers. The 
differences-in-differences fixed effects estimator allows us to isolate variations in dependent 
variable due to changes in independent variables conditional to the particular project’s 
characteristics, which make them more attractive for programmers.  
Restating our hypotheses in terms of our independent variables, we obtain a set of 
equations to test as expressed in Table 1. 
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 The effect on project success of:  is  than the effect of 
H1. Active-Inbound + Inactive-Inbound > Active-Outbound + Inactive-Outbound  
H2. Active-Inbound > Inactive-Inbound 
H3. Duality-Outbound = Active-Outbound 
H4. Duality-Inbound > Duality-Outbound 
 
Table 1. Equations and expected results 
4. Results 
We have observed our data in a descriptive way, and furthermore we performed 
differences-in-differences fixed effects regressions to test whether our theoretical arguments 
hold. Table 2 reports basic descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
The initial descriptive analysis indicates that projects, on average, report an increase of 20 
downloads every month. Nonetheless, we observe that there is huge dispersion on this variable, 
as the minimum and maximum increase in downloads is approximately 400,000. Concerning the 
different ties in our study, we also observe an extremely low mean, but an important dispersion, 
except for the Inactive-outbound ties that do not present any variation at all, and finally they are 
not included in the regression analysis. 
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Variation in: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max. 
Project success: 
Downloads 20.819 5004.585 -468651.500 463422.500 
 
Active-inbound 0.005 0.095 -3.995 7.277 
 
Inactive-inbound 0.010 0.209 -8.444 14.738 
 
Active-outbound 0.003 0.063 -3.270 3.003 
 
Inactive-outbound 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Duality-inbound 0.002 0.159 -3.089 16.547 
 
Duality-outbound 0.004 0.073 -1.178 5.458 
  
Size 0.007 0.175 -8.618 10.279 
 
Table 2. Basic descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 reports the results from differences-in-differences fixed effects on downloads. 
We addressed our empirical analysis by identifying knowledge flows among projects by 
studying diverse typologies of ties relating the possible ‘member’ and ‘contribution’ 
combinations. Here we show two basic regressions; Model 1 presents the basic model with 
controls. The control variables do not significantly explain variation in rates of downloads, 
except for the previous period difference in downloads, which has a negative effect on current 
period difference in downloads. This result is an indicator that projects present a decreasing 
trend in their success. Model 2 contains all our measures for ties as explanatory variables. We 
obtain that active-inbound ties have a positive and significant effect on the rate of downloads. It 
means there is a benefit from receiving assistance from individuals who play the ‘contributor’ 
role in focal project while they also contribute to others. We also find that inactive-inbound ties 
have a negative although non-significant effect. It implies there is no gain in just receiving 
knowledge from outside. The active-outbound ties show a surprising positive and significant 
effect; it means the focal project benefits from individuals who play the ‘member’ role while 
they are ‘contributors’ outside. The inactive-outbound ties drop from our regression, as this 
variable does not show variation over time. It means there is a fixed load of individuals who 
consistently do not contribute to any project. Duality-inbound ties have a negative and 
significant effect on project success; meanwhile, duality-outbound ties have a significant and 
strong negative effect on rate of downloads. 
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Dependent variable: 
Project Success 
 (1)  (2)  
Active-inbound    1517.380 *** 
    0.000  
Inactive-inbound    -97.452  
    0.455  
Active-outbound    1217.611 *** 
    0.001  
Inactive-outbound    -  
      
Duality-inbound    -337.702 ** 
    0.032  
Duality-outbound    -765.607 ** 
    0.031  
Project success 
t-1
  -0.490 *** -0.489 *** 
  0.000  0.000  
 Size  -108.597  -225.611  
  0.502  0.167  
AGE  -36.543  -35.458  
  0.440  0.453  
STAGE  -159.904  247.215  
  0.935   0.899  
 project characteristics controls included 
F  0.831  629.98  
P>F  0.000  0.000  
** significant at 5%        *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 3. Results from differences-in-differences fixed effects regressions 
Viewed through our hypotheses, we can observe that this study confirms hypothesis 1, 
because the aggregate effects of active and inactive inbound ties (1419.48) are greater than the 
aggregate effects of active and inactive outbound ties (1217.611). Therefore, reception of 
knowledge is more favourable than provision for project success. 
In hypothesis 2, we expect to have a greater effect from active-inbound ties than from 
inactive-inbound ties. Our result is consistent with hypothesis 2, and confirms that it is better for 
project success if individuals have unique insight during all the projects. 
 Hypothesis 3 establishes no [significant] difference among duality-outbound and active-
outbound ties’ effects on project success. Nonetheless, we find a stronger, positive effect of 
active-outbound ties compared to duality-outbound ties. Our results do not support hypothesis 3. 
Despite the fact that this result contradicts the theory and our expectations it may imply that 
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those individuals serving as active-outbound ties attract the attention of other individuals because 
they open new channels for project diffusion or establish a good reputation on other projects. 
 We found that duality-inbound ties have a greater effect than duality-outbound ties, 
although both are negative; therefore, our results confirm hypothesis 4. It may mean that 
individuals that play the ‘duality’ role on the focal project while they contribute to other projects 
distract resources and attention from the focal project. 
Overall results demonstrate that knowledge flows are significant for project success, and 
they build channels for flow on the extent that there is structural diversity. 
 
5. Discussion and implications for future research 
Social capital, generally defined as the actual and potential resources embedded in 
relationships among actors, is an important predictor of group and organisational performance 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002; Bourdieu, 1986; Leana and Van Buren, 1999; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). The structural dimension of social capital focuses on the nature and strength of 
relationships, and the communication flows embedded in networks of individuals and 
organisations. The advantages ascribed to social capital include better group communication, 
efficient collective action, enhanced stocks and use of intellectual capital, and better access to 
resources. Social capital also applies when answering questions about individual motivations; 
programmers consider it useful to maintain their social network alive and nurture the relation by 
providing their knowledge. This assertion is consistent with Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), who 
postulate that the relational dimension of social capital induces actors to formulate an 
expectation on the value of the resources they supply to the structure [6]. 
A network of OSS projects is fertile ground for testing and supporting the sources of 
social capital. Contributions to projects are the sole means for development and success, but their 
patterns differ widely across OSS projects; some projects attract a large number of contributors 
while others do not. There are projects in which most of the advances come from the voluntary 
contributions of their own members, while others rely on contributions from actors initially 
assigned to other projects. Ties between OSS projects represent the network structure, and 
                                                 
6 Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) identify three dimensions of  social capital that inhere in knowledge exchange and 
recombination: (1) structural, which reflects the impersonal pattern of ties; (2) relational, as a sense of trust, norms, 
obligations and expectations that actors develop along connections; and (3) cognitive, as the bonding force, such as 
shared understanding and identification that hold the group together. These three aspects of social capital combine to 
improve information transmission and absorption among organizational members, thus enhancing overall 
organizational performance. 
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therefore they are able to indicate differential levels of social capital based on individuals’ 
affiliations and roles. We identified social capital in terms of the social network of the OSS as 
the number of ties generated through members and contributors and the role they play by solving 
programming gaps in both focal and other projects. 
In this research, the straightforward outcome is empirical evidence concerning 
differences in social capital depending on the structural diversity of project members by 
identifying paths of communication across different projects. Moreover, empirical results also 
indicate that some social capital arguments do not hold as the effects of the role played by 
individuals is a significant source of variance in the access to network resources and project 
success. Explicitly, we find that project members playing a contributor’ role in the focal project 
and in other projects do not contribute to success, but instead hamper it. We also find that 
knowledge and skills received through inbound ties lead to superior success, whereas providing 
knowledge and skills to other projects is beneficial to one’s own success only if individuals play 
an active role as contributors in other projects beyond pure membership.  
The core of our contribution relies on the measurement and identification of the 
collaborative structure – by identifying programmers’ roles and affiliations - for knowledge 
sharing and the differential effects on project success related to knowledge reception and 
provision. As our own results show, this measurement supports the generalised reciprocity 
exchange theory; therefore, with the aim of finding significant sources of social capital, the 
necessity emerges for accounting differences in investment strategies or knowledge exchanges 
that complement the stock of capital.  
However, one of the main limitations of the present study is that we do not measure the 
quality of the exchange, but only its direction. While we know inbound ties provide new 
knowledge and improved performance, we do not know anything about the quality of that 
knowledge. Thus, a project may need to tie to a broad collection of projects because of the poor 
quality of inbound contributions. Equally, in the case of outbound knowledge, we could assume 
the contributions of project members make them visible to the network, but we do not know how 
valuable their contribution is for others. Neither do we account for modularity of the project; a 
project with plenty of modules is more attractive to programmers because they clearly identify 
tasks and goals (Baldwin and Clark, 2006). 
Another drawback involves our inability to link the different functions played by the 
contributors. We affirmed the presence of skill complementarities [that should be positively 
associated to project performance] in networks of cooperation across OSS projects; nevertheless, 
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we do not measure complementarities but assume they occur through ties. Different participants 
perform different functions that facilitate the rapid change and creation of stable releases, 
including testing, contributing new changes, coordinating releases, and maintaining 
documentation. An important aspect of the collaborative approach is to help individuals find 
tasks in which they can better apply and exploit their talents. Moreover, self-selection and 
voluntary participation shape projects to reach the required level of complementary skills, which 
we were unable to include in our analysis.  
We foresee a promising vein of research about social capital and OSS networks, as they 
present a symbiotic environment. Research on social capital will nurture findings derived from 
the study of open source software networks; meanwhile our understanding of the open source 
software phenomenon enriches us with a deep consciousness regarding the exchange processes 
for the creation of a valuable stock of social capital. 
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Introduction. 
Open source software (OSS) mode of production is the object of study of many scholars, 
because it contradicts and questions many traditional concepts in economics and management 
theories, about motivations for contributing and hierarchical structures of governance. Since 
2001, research in OSS addresses two branches. One devotes effort to demonstrate efficiency and 
productivity predominance of OSS over conventional software, while the other attempts to 
discuss the economic and management aspects that tune the innovation in such environment. 
Scholars stress the division by recognizing two mainstreams of analysis: better performance at 
lower cost and incentives under non-contractual forms of organization, (Dalle and David; 2004). 
 
Disregarding the concern about superior quality of open source software, economics and 
management scholars struggle to find the drivers that lead individuals freely contribute to 
software generation, and the implications for innovation management. OSS production process 
conform a public good economy, where its development through a virtual network community 
exacerbates its public nature. Everyone benefits from contributing to software by developing 
code, individuals share also computer equipment, software repositories and operating standards, 
and every person who has access to the community rapidly obtains the outcome of others’ 
provision (von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006). Goods are non-excludable, therefore, there is no 
loss if other individuals use it; on the contrary, goods gain value from greater user-base. As in 
any other public good economy, we can expect that some individuals may want to wait and see 
what other developers produce and then benefit from others’ code for their own use, (Baldwin 
and Clark, 2006). 
 
Despite a free-riding problem in OSS has never been discussed as an issue to avoid, there 
are many studies that, on the contrary, provide explanations about why people contribute. 
Scholars compare OSS to a gift-giving economy where individuals find ego-gratification in 
giving (Ljungberg, 2000), a generalized exchange economy where reciprocity and trust is the 
key driver for contribution (Hertel, 2003) or a scientific community where motivation is the 
personal gratification of finding a discovery or reputation acquired among their peers (Ljungberg 
2000, Lerner and Tirole, 2001). 
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In a pragmatic view, earlier arguments claim individuals receive private benefits from 
contribution (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). These private benefits do come in the form of abstract 
but desirable goods, such as reputation and career concerns (Lerner and Tirole, 2001), self-
fulfillment (von Krogh et al, 2003), or social approval (Ljungberg, 2000; Hertel, 2003). Other 
benefits are that individuals feel attracted to contribute in tasks where they can provide 
meaningful knowledge to mathematical and programming challenges given they have the 
appropriate skills to accomplish them (von Krogh et al., 2003) or because the atomized software 
architecture provide higher value from code production at lower levels of effort (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2006). Besides, the increasing number of firms that start engaging in OSS pay their 
programmers for developing code in open mode, therefore motives shift from intrinsic to 
extrinsic (Roberts et al., 2006). Most of these claims proceed from theoretical propositions 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Lerner and Tirole, 2001); simulations (Dalle and David, 2003); case 
studies and longitudinal analysis of relevant single OSS projects (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006; 
Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; von Krogh et al, 2003); and direct 
interviews and surveys about why contributors contribute (Hertel et al. 2003; Roberts et al, 
2006). 
 
Here we present an exploratory study of the determinants for contribution among 
individuals who decide to join a project for OSS development. We use a sub-sample of 3685 
projects for the development of computer games over 12 months, from the Sourceforge.net 
repository, where 6939 individuals have signed as team members but not all of them contribute 
to software development. In our analysis, we have controlled for some motivators, such as wages 
and value derived from use, and included most of theoretical determinants for contributions, 
such as attractiveness of project, complementarities among contributions, and individual 
inclinations for contribute, such as preferences, search for reputation and role played by 
individuals. We use number of team members and number of outsider contributors for 
controlling free riding and find interesting effects: Individuals are less likely to contribute as the 
number of team members’ increase, but are more likely to contribute as the number of outsider 
contributors’ increase. These findings suggest the emergence of a governance-like structure that 
may exert control on the outcome of outsiders’ contributions. The governance structure gains 
legitimacy as a meritocracy, and act as social control of production process (Eisenhardt, 1985), 
instead of applying a coercive authoritarian control that could deter other individuals’ 
participation (Henderson and Lee, 1992; de Laat, 2007). Our findings open a new vein of 
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research in OSS where governance and control go beyond a single project management authority 
and control mechanisms are example and behavior imitation. 
 
Theories about cooperation and contribution in OSS. 
OSS movement big question is still how programmers do contribute in code production. 
The production process of open source software requires the contributions of developers who 
donate their time, effort and knowledge to create pieces of code.  Developers usually are 
volunteers or self-employed individuals and rarely there are contractual relations among them 
and the project to which they provide their contributions. Moreover, in open source networks, 
there are many individuals involved simultaneously in several projects, therefore, commitment 
between developers and projects rely on looser bonds where there is neither pecuniary reward in 
case of contribution nor punishment in case of defection (Roberts et al.; 2006). 
 
Open source movement has the halo of a culture that encourages individuals to contribute 
and share their knowledge, with the promise that outstanding contributions will provide status 
and influence; nonetheless, there are few empirical explanations about why individuals 
contribute (Raymond, 1998). The general assumption is that OSS performs as a gift-giving 
economy where individuals gain recognition from others when providing gifts to other 
individuals in their community (Ljungberg, 2000). Although some defendants of OSS claim this 
as a good explanation (Raymond, 1998; Stallman, 1997), Ljungberg (2000) himself considers 
that similarities are too constrained, because in a gift-giving economy the gift usually is not a 
public good, and the recipient is the person who obtains benefits from the gift, while the gift-
giver obtains benefits from the act of giving. The main characteristic of contributions to open 
source software is that they are gifts or provisions to public, non-excludable goods; therefore, the 
gift-giver provides the gift but also enjoys it. Ljungberg (2001) also compares OSS to a scientific 
community. He encounters drivers of OSS ‘economy’ relying on reputation, status, and career 
concerns, like job opportunities, and indirect pecuniary benefits; Lerner and Tirole, (2001) share 
these assumptions and confirm some of them at case studies from Apache and Sendmail projects. 
OSS contributions also represent a generalized exchange economy supported by the expectation 
that if a community member provides assistance today, someone else will provide him with 
assistance when he needs it (Mendez-Duron and Garcia, 2008).  
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OSS projects’ collaborative structure is based on cooperation by knowledge sharing 
defined here as the provision or reception of information, expertise, and feedback regarding the 
development and/or modification of a source code. 
 
According to scholars who study cooperation from a sociological perspective, 
cooperation involves three conditions: it is costly to the contributor, it is valuable for others who 
receive the contribution, and it is voluntary (Holländer, 1990).  In gift giving economies, the 
others receiving the gift manifest sympathy and gratitude towards the contributor, and these 
actions generate a sentiment of social approval for the contributor (Holländer, 1990). An 
individual that is part of a group will exert an effort to contribute to public good provision if 
other members in the group also exert a similar effort (Sugden, 1984). The realization of an 
effort will be dependent on the reciprocity and exchange within members of the group; 
individuals feel an obligation towards other members if they benefit from public good. Kollock, 
(1993) posits that relaxed systems to measure the extent of contributions lead to more stable 
exchange relationships. Relaxed systems rely on trust7, assign differential threshold levels at 
which individuals are supposed to contribute and assume that contributions can be of diverse 
nature; therefore, an individual does not need to receive the exact amount and kind of 
contribution that she has given away. Even under these conditions, it would be naïve to think that 
individuals in OSS act disinterestedly or just for social approval, because an individual, by 
giving code create the obligation on recipients to give other code back, although repayment is 
not direct nor immediate (Zeytlin, 2003). 
 
From an economic perspective, an individual would contribute to a public good if 
contribution were the best response to others’ strategies. An individual will contribute onto a 
public good if her expected value is higher than her reservation utility; if she expects to have 
superior rewards from contribution, rather than devoting effort to something else; or if risk 
associated to contribution is lower than the level of expected utility obtained from public good, 
(Harstad, 1980). 
 
Lerner and Tirole (2001) shed light onto economic conjectures about contribution in 
OSS. They claim that OSS do not necessarily contradict economic paradigm, because individuals 
                                                 
7 Kollock denotes trust as credit as in the case of accounting, where an individual would be indebted towards others by creating 
the bonding of trust. 
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can gain a private benefit from contribution and their reservation value is greater than their 
effort.  They reinforce the idea that many of motives that lead programmers to contribute refer to 
reputation and career concerns.  
 
From a psychological perspective, in OSS, individuals may have multiple motivations for 
contribution and these motivations may range from intrinsic to extrinsic (Roberts, et al, 2006). 
Among the many explanations for contribution, intrinsic motivations are those that satisfy basic 
human needs, like contributing for personal curiosity to solve mathematical puzzles, or being 
part of a community (Lakhani et al, 2003). Extrinsic motivations are those applied or imposed by 
an external source that rules the impulse to contribute, like gaining reputation, improving a 
career or being paid (Roberts et al. 2006). 
 
When a collectivity is supposed to contribute, size of the collectivity always matters. 
Even in a group of size two, one of the individuals would have incentives to free ride and under-
provide public good, (Smith, 1980; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Offerman et al., 1996). One of the 
main arguments is that when an individual perceives the effectiveness of her contribution 
decreases, her willingness to contribute also decreases.  Such perception increases when the size 
of collectivity increases. In open source software provision, there exists a serious temptation to 
free ride on others’ contributions. Programmers can wait and see how other people contribute 
and later benefit from these contributions. 
 
Solutions to reduce free riding effect on teams are separating ownership from labor 
(Holmstrom, 1982; Maitland et al, 1985); or creating competition among team members 
(Holmstrom, 1982). The first solution, although quite common in private firms, it is very 
unlikely to apply to open source software, as by definition, ownership belongs to nobody. The 
second solution is more likely to apply in our setting, if individual contribution is to be compared 
with others performance, and the reward or punishment come from differential access to private 
benefits. If the contribution terms seem equitable for all individuals then, contribution will occur 
(Maitland et al. 1985). 
 
Kollock (1998) provides three types of solutions for contribution, motivational, strategic 
and structural solutions. Motivational solutions imply actors are not totally egotist, while 
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strategic solutions deal with private benefits from contribution and cooperation. Finally, 
structural solutions imply a change in structure that leads to higher or lower contribution rates. 
 
Drivers for contribution. 
Different theories have given various arguments that support motivations for contribute. 
All these views seem to be complementary, because evidence shows that there is no single driver 
for contribution; on the contrary, individuals have several simultaneous motivations to 
contribute, (Hertel et al., 2003; Roberts et al., 2006; Zeytlin, 2003). Several authors hypothesize 
about the drivers for contribution in OSS; here we summarize some of their arguments. 
 
Use-value of the project. Since their start, projects usually have an objective, goal or 
milestone to accomplish, and somewhat they follow a plan. It is plausible that, depending on 
project ambitions, the planning is tight or loose in terms of tasks. Overtime, projects will 
accomplish or not their goals, but in all cases, individuals can infer from their planning if 
projects attire their attention because they can obtain a value from its use or because they pose 
interesting programming puzzles which challenge their abilities (Hertel et al., 2003; Lerner and 
Tirole, 2002; Raymond 1999, Roberts et al., 2006). The more use- value individuals obtain from 
project, more likely are to participate. 
 
Search for personal reputation and career concerns. The most remarked argument from 
economic scholars about incentives to contribute is the search of personal recognition. Lerner 
and Tirole (2002) study deals with reputation, career concerns and ego gratification as theories to 
explain individual propensity to contribute. They studied the enrolment of professionals in 
Apache, Perl and Sendmail projects and found that signalling incentives play a major role as 
individual motivation.  Hertel et al. (2003) study individual incentives of Linux developers to 
participate in the kernel project -main architecture platform of Linux-; in psychological 
perspective, they found that main drivers for contribution are individual reputation and social 
comparison. Also von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) and von Krogh et al. (2003) finds that 
newcomers need to adapt when they are about contributing in official pre-defined modular 
software architecture, but they are more likely to contribute when the architecture design is still 
somewhat open. Nonetheless, if individuals are trying to signal themselves as good 
programmers, they would like to contribute soon in the project, to obtain sooner the benefits 
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from reputation. Therefore, individuals who seek a strong reputation as programmers are more 
likely to contribute. 
 
Individual creativity.  Individuals who need that some software characteristics are quickly 
developed are more likely to be innovative. Von Hippel, (2003) denominates these individuals as 
lead users and postulate they are great sources for innovation. Lead users are more likely to be 
innovative because they experience needs for products much before the majority of other users. 
Roberts et al. (2006) also test for intrinsic motivators to contribute, considering individual risk 
preferences and creativity as such motivators. Creativity helps to solve problems, and in 
particular, to design appropriate pieces of code. Moreover, the open nature of the innovation 
process in OSS promotes that individuals bring their innovations towards projects because the 
absence of routines do not hamper that contributors rapidly observe the outcome of their 
innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1958). Therefore as individual creativity increases, the 
likelihood of contribution increases. 
  
Individual Skills.  Individuals who have specific intellectual capital to develop and solve 
specific tasks are more likely to participate (Maitland et al., 1985) due to costs of contribution 
have diminishing returns to intellectual capital investments. Individuals may participate in 
software as they have the skills and expertise demanded by the project. If individuals feel they 
are too far from the level of expertise required, they hardly could make significant contributions, 
and then their willingness to participate would erode. Giuri et al., (2004), find also that there is 
some self-selection division of labour within OSS projects, and that individuals choose to 
contribute in those activities who match their own skills.  Therefore, individuals that are more 
skilled are more likely to contribute. 
 
Complementarities among contributions. Relying on the same principles of labour 
division as before, one may think that contributions are somewhat complementary. Baldwin and 
Clark (2006) proposed that projects with high modularity and in their study, high option value 
are more likely to attract a larger number of individual programmers, and that they actually 
contribute.  Their argument underlies that in the absence of overlap in software creation, if the 
value of code produced is higher than the cost or effort to produce it, willingness to contribute 
will increase. Value of code produced increases with modularity, therefore when many other 
contributors provide their knowledge in small, well-defined tasks, that ensemble together into a 
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modular architecture, the value of total code will increase.  When relaxing the non-overlap in 
software creation assumption, the incentives for contribution decrease, because many other 
programmers could provide an alternative appropriate solution to the same problem. It means 
that if an individual perceives that her contributions are complementary to others’, individuals 
are more likely to participate, whereas contributions are substitute, individuals are less likely to 
participate. 
 
In addition to the factors above mentioned, there could be other that may structurally 
affect contribution to OSS, rather than modify the willingness to contribute. We consider these 
factors as accessory and not determinant in our model, but should not be disregarded. 
 
Time availability. If individuals face some time constraints, it is very likely they would 
reduce their production of code. It would imply that if individuals face compromise to their 
individual work, personal circumstances and an active profile of contribution, their likelihood to 
contribute would decrease. 
 
Intellectual property protection schemes. Trust in other individuals’ behaviour about 
appropriation of software would drive the willingness to contribute, as contributors may fear that 
other users or commercial companies might exploit own efforts. The emergence of licenses that 
restraint for appropriation, -although they allow for free copy, modification and distribution, 
would lead to a higher willingness to contribute. Therefore, as more restrictive is the project 
license in terms of appropriation, more likely individuals will contribute.  
 
Pay. Recently, an increasing number of firms have engaged in OSS creation. 
Programmers of theses companies receive a performance pay as in any other type of industry, 
but as Roberts et al. (2006) find, pay substitute intrinsic motivations for contribute. Nonetheless, 
we can expect that monetarily rewarded individuals are more likely to contribute. 
 
Data and Methods. 
The analysis of contribution in OSS demands a thorough database that from one side 
provides intricate details of project formation, organization and operation, and from other side 
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details about the implication of individuals in the software development. Moreover, data should 
provide some evidence - or at least to allow for control, of the individual drivers for contribution. 
 
 
3.1. Data setting 
The data we use in this analysis come from the SourceForge.net Research Data, gathered 
by Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Notre Dame. 
SourceForge.net is the largest repository of open source software; it hosts over 170,000 projects 
and gathers over 1.5 million of registered users. SourceForge.net belongs to OSTG, Inc, who has 
shared activity data with the University of Notre Dame for the purpose of academic research on 
OSS, under the condition to share further the data to other researchers interested in open source 
software phenomenon (Christley and Madey, 2005). 
 
Sourceforge.net as a repository has several characteristics that promote network 
exchanges. The purpose of repository is to provide a platform for software development over a 
worldwide web infrastructure for knowledge exchange. They host projects and provide tools that 
allow asynchronous communication, stock people’s contribution, and screen software from 
redundant knowledge. To host a project in Sourceforge.net, an initiator should register on the 
network; and post a message to the platform indicating the type of software, its purpose and 
target public, the intellectual property regime, the programming language, the user interface, the 
phase of development and the team workforce who will be responsible for developing and 
controlling the software. Then Sourceforge.net administrators authorize the creation of a space 
for hosting the project, if it satisfies the main premises for the repository. Once the repository 
hosts the project, then it registers and controls all its activity. Every time there is a movement on 
the project, the repository electronically archives the information; these movements may include 
communications among members, forum posts, and more important, the artifacts –or modules of 
software code, produced by the people engaged in programming activities. As an important 
feature of a repository is to open the access to projects to everybody on the worldwide web, 
every single person, registered or not on Sourceforge.net, may see the project, look at the code, 
and contribute. The repository records changes in the team workforce, so it is possible to know if 
there are new members or if some of them have already quitted the project. The repository also 
records all the contributions of people outside of members of the project. As repository tracks all 
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artifacts records, we can identify who are who are members of the project and who of them 
actually contribute. 
 
Particularly, our dataset is a sub-sample of 69693 valid observations over twelve months 
of projects aimed at developing games’ software. To get this sample, we look at the monthly 
dumps of data and select all projects that belong to the category of GNU Public License 
(GPL)[8].  We restrict the sample to such license to guarantee that projects were not subject to 
any restriction for copy, adoption and distribution, so all software is equally prone to reach the 
same audience. Constraining our sample to this license allows us to control for differences in 
intellectual property protection regime; therefore, we will test the likelihood to contribute in 
projects with comparable intellectual property schemes. Then, we limit the sample to games in a 
general category. This selection obeys to the purpose of tapping an appropriate control for use-
value. Individuals that contribute into a software game are more likely to search amusement 
rather than solely solve a specific programming puzzle. Further, we restrict the sample for the 
projects that were alive during the whole sample, we make this decision because dataset 
classifies a project as ‘alive’ –when the repository still host the project, and ‘dead’ when they 
quit the repository. Unfortunately, it is impossibly to distinguish if the project has quitted the 
repository because it went independently, or moved to other repository, or just ended; thus, their 
disappearance does not necessarily relate to market demands, or product lifecycles, but to 
managerial premises. In addition, we look at those projects whose information on downloading 
activity is available, as the source of information comes from relational database, some 
observations could be missing in the joining process; we want to control for possible crowding 
effects due to successful projects that can attract a higher number of programmers. Finally, we 
should remark that none of these projects pay their developers for contribute; therefore 
contribution is altruistic in the sense of pure monetary rewards. We follow this procedure over 
twelve months running from February 2005 to January 2006, to build an unbalanced panel with 
69693 total observations. With the use of these data, we can control for many of the variables 
used by other researchers, and we can scrutinize deeper less studied variables and search for 
other possible explanations. 
 
3.2. Variables and analysis 
                                                 
8 GPL grants the programmers and users of software the privileges on freedom to distribute and modify copies of the 
software, and transfers those privileges to further developments. 
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Dependent Variable. Individual contribution of member i in project J. (Contribute) 
We look for likelihood for contribution in software projects for those individuals who has 
signed as members of the project. An individual acquires membership condition when she asks 
the project manager to belong to the core team and thus, her name appears in the front cover of 
the project. In addition, we want to control for project characteristics that make it prone to 
contribution. For every single software project in our sample, we have recorded when each 
individual i that is member of the project J has sent code. We have grouped contributions in 
months, therefore we have identified whether an individual has contributed to a particular project 
J in month t. For every single month, we record individual contribution as a dichotomous 
variable, with value 1 if individual i has contributed to project J in time t, and value 0 if 
individual i has not contributed to project J in time t.  
 
Independent variables. Drivers for contribution. 
Search for personal reputation and career concerns (first project). Personal reputation 
comes from the signal the individual provides about her quality. In our dataset we have 
information about individuals within the network, we cannot observe the outside-the network 
world. Therefore, we cannot directly relate the total effect of contribution to individual 
reputation. Nonetheless, we can observe if the project of study is the first project, in which the 
individual appears as member. We use an indicator variable of value 1 if this project is the first 
for the individual, and zero otherwise.  If individuals concern about reputation and invest in a 
signal, participating in their first project as soon as they enter would be a reliable measure of the 
signal. If the contribution is poor, everyone within and outside the network would realize about 
it; therefore contribution in the first project is costly, and only those skilled programmers can 
afford to send the signal.   Contribution in first project satisfies all the conditions for effective 
signalling, it is costly, but those with higher programming skills face a lower cost. 
 
Individual creativity (code contributions).  We consider two different measures of 
individual creativity: First, the total number of artifacts, or packages of code, a member sends to 
any project at time t. Second, the aggregate overtime total number of artifacts, a member has sent 
to any project at time t. These measures accounts for how the individual is likely to propose 
tasks, as well as detect and solve bugs in a given period. The first measure, only looks at the 
pieces of code sent without taking into account how many contributions has make up to that 
date. The second measure takes into account all contributions made by individual.  
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Complementarities among contributions (COMPLEMENTARITIES). Each piece of code, 
or artifacts, is classified in categories. These categories could be general or specific to the 
project.  We count the total number of categories for a project, and we construct a ratio of the 
categories in which individual i does not contribute divided by the total number of categories. If 
this ratio increases, it means that other individuals care for more categories in the project, while 
if the ratio decreases, it means that individual i care for the most of categories.  
 
Individual Skills (SKILLS). We use also categories of artifacts. We count the number of 
categories in which each individual i contributes in all projects within the network and divide by 
the number of projects in which individual i contributes. If the ratio is greater than one, 
individual is able to contribute into more than one category per project, therefore is more skilled 
than other individuals that solely contribute to one category or less. 
 
Control variables.  
Time availability (code contributions squared). Our database does not allow us to infer 
other activities beyond the network on which the individual could have compromise. 
Nonetheless, we can observe the level of contribution within the network. We measure time 
constraints as the square of the number of artifacts that an individual sends to all projects in that 
period. 
 
Number of members of the project (members). We want to control for the propensity to 
free ride a member of the project could have by relying on the contributions of other individuals 
who sign as members of the project.  
 
Number of outsider contributors of the project (other contributors). We control for the 
propensity to free ride a member of the project could have by relying on the contributions of 
other individuals who are not members of the project, but are willing to contribute. 
 
Role in the project (manager and developer). We control for the member that the project 
manager assigned to each member. We include the most common categories, project manager 
and developer, and use as base of comparison any other role. We use the dichotomous variable 
manager with value 1 if the individual plays the project manager role, and zero otherwise. We 
 46 
use the dichotomous variable developer with value 1 if the individual plays the project developer 
role. 
 
Project performance (downloads). We consider the aggregate past performance of the 
project in terms of its number of downloads as control for the possible attractiveness a project 
may have for its own performance.  
 
We use a fixed effects panel data estimator for the dichotomous variable Contribute. We 
use the logistic regression that allows us to control for fixed effects of the pair individual i -
project J over the twelve-month period. We also run a logistic regression as if data were cross-
section just for control. 
 
Results. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of individuals among projects.  In the graph, we observe a 
skewed distribution of individuals; in particular, 2356 projects have only one member, 
meanwhile there are approximately 50 projects that have more than 10 members. Concerning 
individuals, 6701 are members solely in one project, while the rest are members in no more than 
four projects simultaneously.  In table 1 we present descriptive statistics of main variables, 
whereas in table 2, we present their correlation matrix. Table 3 shows the robust regression 
results, model 1 and 2 are logistic cross-sectional data over all the observations.  We notice that 
COMPLEMENTARITIES has positive sign and is significant at 5%, it confirms the main 
arguments regarding individuals are more likely to contribute if there are some 
complementarities among contributions. Individuals observe in how many categories other 
individuals participate, and if this measure increases, she is more likely to contribute, therefore 
individuals foresee that there would be complementarities with her own contributions.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of individuals among projects. 
 
Creativity, measured by code contributions would influences positively the likelihood to 
contribution, because individuals have personal characteristics that increase their willingness to 
give away ideas and solutions for problem solving, unfortunately this factor is not significant. 
Total Artifacts Squared represents time constraints of individuals with respect to active 
contribution within the network.  Its coefficient resulted negative and but non-significant, even, 
the result indicates that contribution has a U-shape on Total Artifacts. If the individual faces his 
first project, the likelihood to contribute is very high, and has a strong significant effect. This 
reveals the desire to quickly signal in the network.  Regarding the control variables, we find the 
negative and significant effect in number of members, but significant and positive effects in 
number of other contributors.  It seams that members of a project would free ride in own 
colleagues but feel reinforced to contribute when outsiders also contribute. Being a developer 
and a manager is also significant to contribution, although, as expected, the effect of being a 
developer is higher than being a manager. Overall, past project performance has no effect on 
individual contribution. We included the squared term of total artifacts in order to control to 
decreasing returns to scale. We find a significant negative effect of total artifacts squared, 
implying that individuals would be less likely to contribute if as the number of total artifacts 
increase. 
Models 1 and 2 presented a pseudo-R2 of 0.69, it means that these variables explain 
almost 70 percent of likelihood of contribution. 
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Models 3, 4 and 5 are the fixed-effects logistic regression results, studied over a period of 
12 months. Results confirm the cross-sectional analysis, except for the roles of developer and 
manager, that counting overtime effects, there is no significant likelihood to contribute. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix. 
 
 
Table 3. Cross-section Logistic and Panel Data Fixed Effects Logistic Regression 
Results. 
             
1 Contribute 1
2 Total artifacts 0.3093 * 1
3 Total artifacts 2 0.1737 * 0.9354 * 1
4 Code contributions 0.2972 * 0.2343 * 0.1474 * 1
5 Code contributions 2 0.1384 * 0.1424 * 0.0918 * 0.8552 * 1
6 First project 0.3989 * 0.1461 * 0.094 * 0.338 * 0.1295 * 1
7 Members -0.0253 * 0.0093 * 0.0086 * -0.004 0.0012 -0.026 * 1
8 Other contributors 0.2023 * 0.4956 * 0.4916 * 0.1369 * 0.0862 * 0.0762 * 0.0018 1
9 Developer 0.0255 * 0.0092 * 0.0048 0.0015 0.0027 -0.0109 * 0.1485 * 0.004 1
10 Manager 0.0065 -0.0034 -0.0028 -0.0012 -0.0039 0.0014 -0.0583 * -0.0002 -0.2129 * 1
11 Downloads 0.0297 * 0.0201 * 0.0048 0.0155 * 0.0055 0.0039 0.0627 * 0.0103 * 0.0088 * -0.0161 * 1
9 10 115 6 7 81 2 3 4
Mean Std. Dev Min Max N
Contribute 0.010 0.101 0 1 69643
Total artifacts 1.809 52.268 0 3276 69643
Total artifacts 2 2735.217 142481.300 0 1.07E+07 69643
Code contributions 0.221 3.114 0 225 69643
Code contributions 2 9.745 425.253 0 50625 69643
First project 0.021 0.143 0 1 69643
Members 4.545 5.994 1 42 69643
Other contributors 0.085 3.861 0 357 69643
Developer 0.274 0.446 0 1 69643
Manager 0.107 0.310 0 1 69643
Downloads 9063.099 82549.130 0 2109955 69643
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Conclusions. 
It is difficult to as even in the case where individuals have a strong personal drive for 
contribution, they would choose a project that is at least attractive for own use, and where their 
contributions receive recognition and no one else can appropriate their effort. Here we list and 
discuss some of the drivers for contribution and complement with the theories and previous 
results. 
 
Dependent variable= Contribute t
1 2 3
FIRST PROJECT 4.0458 *** 3.8495 ***
(0.5100) (0.4988)
CODE CONT 0.0003
(0.0492)
CODE CONT CUMULATIVE -0.0460 **
(0.0198)
COMPLEMENTARITIES 1.6670 ** 1.6697 **
(0.7509) (0.7887)
SKILLS 3.9554 *** 3.9949 ***
(0.9475) (0.9739)
CODE CONT 2 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0001)
MEMBERS -3.4099 *** -1.9413 *** -2.0830 ***
(0.2672) (0.2491) (0.2699)
OTHER CONTRIBUTORS 2.6395 *** 0.4877 *** 0.5647 ***
(0.1608) (0.1821) (0.1941)
DEVELOPER -3.0464 * 1.1297 1.3969
(1.7567) (2.9821) (3.0109)
MANAGER -1.6938 0.6196 0.6385
(1.3662) (2.4698) (2.5282)
DOWNLOADS 0.0001 ** 0.0001 0.0001 **
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
TOTAL ARTIFACTS 0.0142 ** 0.0150 ***
(0.0061) (0.0053)
TOTAL ARTIFACTS 2 -3.73E-06 -3.07E-06
(0.0000) (0.0000)
N 5841 5841 5841
n 509 509 509
degrees of freedom 5 12 12
Likelihood Ratio 
X
2 2174.00 2362.35 2355.35
p> 
X
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard errors in parenthesis, * sig. 10%, **sig 5%, ***sig 1%
Fixed effects logistic regression estimates
panel data analysis
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Contrary to previous studies, we do not find a significant effect of being newcomer in the probability of 
contribution. This finding could be related to complementarities on knowledge production.  A newcomer does not 
contribute early in her the project until she is sure her contribution could really bring new knowledge to the project.  
Smith (1980) considers the idea that when in the presence of mechanisms for exclusion from the 
benefits of public goods, then it is possible to induce contribution in a decentralized environment. The idea is 
compatible with our setting, if members of the project consider that in the presence of outsider contributors they 
will get lower payoffs because they will be excluded of the benefits of reputation and self-fulfillment then they are 
more likely to contribute. 
 
Control relationship between project manager and team members is one of the central factors to 
effective performance in information systems teams (Henderson and Lee, 1992). 
Control is the process of creating and monitoring rules through hierarchical authority; it restrict 
employees activities by regulating patterns of interaction and feedback mechanisms. Control is diffused among 
members. Control structures and mechanism derive mainly from task predictability (March and Simon, 1958); as 
task predictability moves from routines to uncertain behaviors, control moves from hierarchy to decentralized 
team-member control.   Highly descentralized teams with open communication channels often fail to finish their 
tasks on time. Managerial behavior control refers to the extent tat the manager monitors and evaluates team 
members’ behavior in order to assist them.  Managerial outcome control is the degree to with the manager monitors 
and evaluates only the outcome produced by the team members. Team members exhibit both self control and 
outcome control. An individual exercises freedom or autonomy to determine both what actions are required and 
how to execute these activities. Team members exercise control over how they accomplish their task. Self-control 
is likely to be implemented when the organization cannot adequately measure behavioral performance or 
standardize transformation procedures. Performance of technically oriented development teams can improve if 
team members engage in increased levels of self-control. Control mechanisms that guide the team towards 
achievement of organizational goals are employed by a team member rather than a manager. Individual team 
member might choose to reallocate his or her efforts among tasks or even employ alternative work procedures or 
methods without advice or feedback from project manager. Team-member outcome control is defined as an attempt 
to influence the performance of the team by providing feedback on performance goal-related outcomes (Henderson 
and Lee, 1992). 
 
An organization can tolerate a work force with highly diverse goals if a precise evaluation system 
exists. In contrast, a lack of precision in performance evaluation can be tolerated when goal incompatibility is 
minor. The choice between the tow is driven by the ease of performance evaluation 
They recognize the chaotic organization of projects does not exclude the presence of leadership, but 
usually, this kind of control relies on meritocracy.  Lerner and Tirole opened the gate to research in open source 
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software, attracting academic attention to governance mechanisms, legal aspects and individual reputation and 
career concerns. 
Nonetheless, this study has several limitations. We cannot observe specialization. The only 
specialization I observe is to become project manager or software developer; in any of these cases, these roles are 
significant. We cannot observe modularity, just the amount of artifacts a project receives, then this is an imperfect 
measure of modularity. If the code architecture were transparent then, I could discriminate among those projects 
who are more modular or not, and their actual effects.  The measure of total artifacts tells two stories in opposite 
directions. First, it could be because the project is actually more modular, or it could be the project has poor 
quality. Failing to discriminate these two settings leads to non-significant results. 
In this study we have considered that contribution is just a single choice, and that drivers for 
contribution depend on individual motivations; actually contribution implies drivers in two steps: 
incentives to innovate plus incentives to reveal innovation. Nevertheless, it would be important to 
disentangle these steps, to understand which for innovators the drivers to reveal information are. 
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social interaction and the creation of a pool of high quality productive assets as determinants for 
organizations reputation. We also find that changes in allocation of productive assets are possible 
deterrents for having a good reputation, but social interaction and assets quality moderate their 
effect. Organizations that distract productive assets for other purposes have lower success; 
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productive assets, the negative impact on reputation will decrease. 
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I. Introduction. 
Reputation is an intangible asset on which organizations rely for acquiring a better 
position in the markets they compete. Its intangible nature makes it hard to measure and to assess 
its effect on organizations success. Nonetheless, when hearing about one organization’s 
reputation, we can make some assumptions about their products or services quality. Reputation 
reveals to some extent information about organizations helping to distinguish their position 
relative to other players within the market where they play. Consequently, high reputation would 
lead to better opportunities for organizations, whether in the form of higher earnings, improved 
access to market for inputs, and higher market share in produce markets (Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990; Podolny, 1993). 
 
An important feature of reputation is that it represents two dimensions of perceived 
quality: First, it informs how consistently an organization performs; second, it informs about 
how other actors perceive its performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 
1994; Podolny, 1993; Rindova et al. 2005). The first dimension is an inference from perception 
about quality by directly observing organization’s past performance; meanwhile the second is an 
inference of the organization’s quality from referrals or endorsements by others. From direct 
observation, reputation involves a signal that allows separating high from low product quality 
organizations (Spence, 1973).  The signal comes from the perception about organization’s 
quality based on previous performance (Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994). Moreover, in order to 
maintain a reputation, organizations have incentives to invest in a reliable and effective signal 
that requires to be sustained over time; therefore, actors care about self-reinforcing their 
reputation by continuously developing high quality activities (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Fudenberg and Levine, 1992; Kim, 1996; Tirole, 1996). From indirect observation, reputation [9] 
comes in the form of an endorsement, that reveals organization’s social position on a hierarchical 
structure that orders players within an industry according to their qualities (Gould 2002; 
Podolny, 1993; Rao, 1994; Stuart et al., 1999). The endorsement emerges from interaction 
among organizations and other actors within a hierarchy, market, industry or network. Structures 
allow inferring information about organizations’ quality from social relations (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994). Therefore, hierarchy is a product of social 
process that self-reinforces organizations’ social positions, which mostly reflect the quality of 
                                                 
9  Sociologists denominate reputation as status; nonetheless, the main concepts are similar in sociology, economics and 
organization.  In the sake of standardization, we have adopted the term “reputation” to denote both reputation and status.  
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interaction and the effort to prevail on other players’ mind rather than the quality of 
organizations per se (Gould, 2002). Overall information inferred from organizations’ reputation 
whether in the form of signal or endorsement is valuable for the observant party. 
 
Even when many scholars pay attention to the determinants and process an organization 
follows for building reputation (i.e., Rao, 1994; Rindova et al, 2005), there are some questions 
still unclear.  Some scholars study the effect of interaction with other players (Rao, 1994), other 
stream of research devote attention to efforts to keep in other people’s mind (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990); and others to the quality of the organization’s inputs and productive assets 
(Gaines-Ross, 2000; Rindova et al, 2005; and Saxton, 1998). Although theorist suggest that the 
quality of productive assets influences other’s perception of organization reputation, (Hall, 1992, 
1993; Rindova, 2005) there are few studies that find strong support. Moreover, it is difficult to 
measure the quality of productive assets, and to find a direct link between them and reputation, 
and their effects on organizations success. 
 
We attempt to find an effect of quality of productive assets on organizations success, 
through a reputation building process. By analyzing over a network of more than 3000 open 
source software projects, the present study assess the quality of productive assets of an 
organization as the quality of individual programmers who belong to a project. We consider the 
signal of past performance and their interrelation to other projects, and we record changes in 
individual commitment to the project. For that purpose, we analyze projects for the development 
of software within the framework of open source mode of production whose members could 
perform programming activities simultaneously in several projects. As a signal of project’s 
reputation due to productive assets, we consider the aggregate past performance over all the 
project members along the whole network. As an endorsement, social interaction or indirect 
dimension of reputation, we consider the network degree these projects achieve by individuals 
belonging simultaneously to other projects. To test the strength of the effect of building 
reputation by past performance and previous relations to other projects, we study changes in 
allocation of productive assets as the nature and the extent of programmers’ commitment to the 
focal project for assessing in which cases the signal or endorsement prevails. The most 
significant difference between our study to other analyses in the field is that our setting allows 
others actors in the network –and even outside the network, to directly observe the quality of 
individual programmers: programmers create and submit their code to projects, thus other 
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programmers can assess both output quality and programmer skills. This particular setting allows 
us to differentiate the self-reinforcement of reputation within the projects subject to analysis, 
isolating the signal and endorsement coming from network interactions. Results indicate that 
aggregate individual past performance and network degree increases success, that negative 
changes in individual commitment to the project negatively affect success, while positive 
changes increase success. Finally, our results show that past individual performance improves 
the effect of changes in individual commitment, while network degree also improves the effect 
of changes in individual commitment, but has an overall negative effect. In the diffusion of 
projects over a network, both past performance and network degree are important sources for 
sustaining reputation, but the effects of network degree are somewhat adverse when considering 
changes in individual commitment. 
 
In the following section, this study addresses the theoretical framework and hypothesis, 
in section 3, the data setting, variables and regression models; in section 4 we present our results, 
and finally in section 5 we discuss our findings, acknowledge our limitations and postulate ideas 
for future research. 
 
II. Theoretical framework, model and hypotheses. 
Studies about the intangible nature of reputation and the process through which 
organizations achieve reputation are common in the grounds of economics, sociology, 
management and organization. Economic theorists devote their attention to the role of reputation 
for solving information asymmetry problems. Sociologists study the nature and extent of social 
interaction to achieve high-ranking status orders. Management and organization theorists care 
about the process an organization follows to build a reputation. 
 
In information economics, the study of an actor’s reputation is widely spread. The focal 
point is that agents care about their reputation if, when interacting with other actors, they foresee 
their current actions may affect future outcomes (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992; Stiglitz, 2000). 
This framework posits a twofold purpose for having good reputation. On one side, actors commit 
to develop activities or show behaviour consistently with their quality because building and 
maintaining a reputation is profitable in the long run (Neral and Ochs, 1992; Heugens et al., 
2004; Tirole, 1996); on the other, commitment to perform such behaviour reveals a signal about 
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the actor’s quality (Schmidt, 1993). Actors invest in reputation because it leads to better market 
opportunities: individuals increase their value in recruitment processes; and organizations can 
charge higher prices or achieve higher market shares.  
 
Within the information economics framework, reputation acts through two mechanisms; 
it is a signal for addressing the adverse selection problem (Schmidt, 1993; Stiglitz, 2000) and it 
is an incentive for addressing the moral hazard problem (DeJong et al, 1985; Fudenberg and 
Levine, 1992; Neral and Ochs, 1992; Stiglitz, 2000). If an actor faces an adverse selection 
problem about an individual agent or a firm products’ quality, reputation mitigates the problem 
(Allen, 1984; Shapiro, 1983; Spence, 1973); reputed organizations are more likely to have a 
better performance in the future, as long as their signal relates to own organization’s quality and 
implies its own effort (Spence, 1973; Tadelis, 1999). Organizations’ effort involve a cost to 
develop the signal; this cost should be high enough that low quality organizations cannot afford 
it, but sufficiently low that high quality organizations are willing to incur into such cost (Spence, 
1973). If the signal cost keeps within this range, high quality organizations will separate from 
low quality ones; if the signal cost is outside this range, high quality organizations will pool with 
low quality ones, (Spence,1973). At the end, actors who need to infer about organizations’ 
quality will know that in a setting where everyone can incur in the same level of effort, 
reputation will no longer have a value. Therefore, reputation is a perception about organization’s 
quality based on the signal its previous performance (Allen, 1984; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; 
Spence, 1973; Tadelis, 1999). 
 
Reputation is also an incentive in itself, because actors care about sustain their own 
reputation by constantly performing well, reducing the moral hazard problem (Stiglitz, 2000). 
Actors of every kind, ranging from individuals (Neral and Ochs, 1992), firms (Schmidt, 1993; 
Tadelis 2002) to governments (Veugelers, 1993) constantly concern about sustaining their 
reputation. It is rational to cooperate with other agent, or to perform high quality activities today 
if the discounted value of future interactions is higher (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Cripps et al, 
2004; Fudenberg and Levine, 1992; Kim, 1996). Explicitly, organizations are willing to give up 
short-term gains in the pursuit of getting higher benefits in the long term, thus building their 
reputation, (Neral and Ochs, 1992). Therefore, organizations need to sustain behaviour in order 
to maintain their reputation, (Cripps et al, 2004; Fudenberg and Levine, 1992). Reputable 
organizations care about self-reinforcing the reputation they behold. 
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Sociology studies on reputation involve the interaction among organizations and other 
actors. In his seminal study about of reputation effects in market competition, Podolny, (1993) 
defined a producer status in the market as the perception of producer’s products quality in 
relation to her competitor’s products perceived quality. This definition inherently assigns to 
reputation the character of a hierarchy, product of a subjective judgment from other actors. In 
this context reputation acts through the mechanism of endorsement. 
 
Whilst many scholars agree that subjective evaluation about quality is the main 
determinant of an organization’s reputation (Podolny, 1993, Stewart, 2005); it is not evident the 
source of the quality under subjective evaluation. Gould (2002) states most studies about status 
divide into two main theories.  One has roots in social position within a hierarchy; the other 
relies on market theories. Scholars that defend organization reputation as a product of social 
position in a hierarchy, propose that differential status emerges from the relative advantage some 
actors have from occupying high quality positions, regardless the preconditions that led to 
occupy such position (Gould, 2002). Positions are expected to be correlated to the potential of an 
actor’s advantages over other in a broad sense, from familiar background to education. Market 
theories about reputation propose it as the result of a signalling game (Podolny, 1993; Gould, 
2002). Reputation emerges from the information about an organization provided by her peers, 
judges and other stakeholders (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Gould, 2002; Rao, 1994; Rindova 
et al., 2005). In the presence of uncertainty about someone’s quality, a reliable source of 
information is her own acquaintances (Podolny, 1993).  Peers’ regard works as a signal, as the 
actors have, until some extent control over their peers’ subjective evaluation, by influencing 
opinion through performance. Moreover, high quality organizations incur in less costly signals 
than low quality organizations. Reputation differentiation is a product of differentiation in 
quality of the actions organizations make, (Gould, 2002). However, reputation as an incentive 
has a self-reinforcing character, where organizations are careful to sustain their signal by 
working on the same features that led to generate the signal. Besides, reputation requires the 
development of a high regard that lasts enough to catch others’ attention; self-reinforced through 
social interaction (Gould, 2002; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; Larson 1992; Stuart et al, 1999). 
For sociologists, the signal plus the bonding to others enhances an organization’s reputation.  
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Organization and management theorists’ interest in the process for building reputation 
relies on the value an organization obtains from it (Rindova et al,. 2005). Some researchers focus 
on previous and current performance as determinant of reputation. For example, previous and 
current performance influences market perception, increasing the opportunities to acquire higher 
earnings (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990); loyalty of soccer team supporters increases with results 
in championships (Czarnitzki and Stadtmann, 2002). Another branch of research on reputation 
recognizes endorsements as a source for reputation building. For example, certifications obtained 
by car manufacturers in quality contests improves their life expectancy in market (Rao, 1994); 
business schools rankings in business magazines increases their prominence in stakeholders’ 
minds, (Rindova et al., 2005); celebrity and expert endorsements diminish the risk associated to 
firm’s products (Biswas et al, 2006; Dean and Biswas, 2001; Seno and Lukas, 2005; Wang, 
2005). In a likely way, some scholars study endorsements from social networks and alliances. 
Cooke and Ryan (2000) study brand strategic alliances, and find that some organizations invest 
in attaching their brand to other reputable brands to acquire higher market shares. Similarly, the 
Zhou et al, (2007) find a strong support for the idea that multinational enterprises obtain a rapid 
entry into market when approaching local social networks because these networks endorse 
organization’s activities and products. Finally, a third branch of research extends on the 
organizations’ internal characteristics to build and sustain reputation. Heugens et al, (2004) 
propose there are some reputation management capabilities that make some organizations more 
successful, when dealing with internal information and communication. Rindova et al, (2005) 
find that the quality of inputs is a good source of organization’s reputation because they actually 
affect the quality of products, and propose, but does not find support, that quality of productive 
assets increase an organization’s reputation because stakeholders can make assumptions about 
the quality of produce. Gaines-Ross, (2000) and Saxton (1998) propose the CEO’s reputation is 
an important source for improved performance for a firm. Thus, for organization theorists, an 
organization’s reputation refers to current and previous performance, social interactions, leader’s 
reputation and internal characteristics to build reputation.  
 
A model for reputation building. 
Theorists suggest that higher reputation leads to the possibility of charging higher prices 
(Allen, 1984; Podolny, 1993; Rindova et al., 2005) or having higher market shares (Podolny, 
1993). A higher market share comprises an increase in demand for the organization’s produce. 
Therefore, we can expect that if organizations invest in their reputation, they will obtain higher 
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demand for their products or will charge a higher price; therefore, they will have greater profits 
and become more successful. To invest in reputation, organizations should continuously develop 
activities that provide reliable signal overtime, and thus sustain their reputation. So far, we have 
discussed that, from organization theory point of view, but consistently to economics and 
sociology, there are three sources for building a reputation, current and previous performance, 
social interactions and internal characteristics. Current and previous performance implies 
recognition of the sources of past success and a quest for continuously improving productive 
processes. 
 
We previously stated that organizational reputation relates to the information about we 
can gather by peers, judges and other stakeholders (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Gould, 2002; 
Rao, 1994). In addition, organizations that have prominence in stakeholders’ mind enjoy higher 
levels of reputation, (Rindova et al., 2005).Therefore, in the quest for having prominence in 
stakeholders mind, an organization that produces high quality goods has interest in building links 
to other actors that can provide reliable information about their quality. These social interactions 
reinforce the organization’s social position. In such a case, we can state that 
 
Hypothesis 1: Organizations that create reputation by developing links to other 
organizations or agents obtain a higher success. 
 
Good quality products require the use of with good quality inputs for their production and 
pass through good quality process, (Rindova et al, 2005). An organization’s reputation is only as 
good as that of its members, where each member has individual and unique traits such as talent, 
diligence or honesty (Tirole, 1996). Past individual behaviour conveys information about these 
traits and generates individual and organizational reputations, (Tirole, 1996). A process for 
building reputation not only requires an investment in human, intellectual or production assets, 
but to be sustained by organizations that should care about every organization member becomes 
promoter and custodian of reputation, (Hall 1992, 1993). Organizations willing to send a signal 
to the market about the quality of their product would be interested in create a pool of high 
quality productive assets that ensures high quality goods and reinforce their reputation. 
Therefore,  
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Hypothesis 2: Organizations that create reputation by developing a pool of high quality 
productive assets obtain higher success. 
 
In organization are common the changes in allocation of productive assets, nonetheless 
these changes can affect output and thus reputation. It is the case of changes in technological 
processes, which can improve or decrease quality of goods produced. They can be also changes 
in the management team, whose decisions can improve or decrease organization’s financial 
performance (Rao, 1994); or changes in the intellectual capital, that in the case of knowledge 
intensive industries, can sustain or decrease the products’ quality (Powell and Snellman, 2004). 
Moreover, if organization changes allocation of productive assets, in such ways that some of its 
productive process cannot longer access to high quality productive assets, its reputation will 
suffer loses. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Changes in allocation of high quality productive assets affects 
organization’s reputation and organization success.  
 
There is low academic consensus about what dimension – social interaction or signal in 
markets - a higher relative importance to solve information asymmetries has. Most empirical 
studies find a higher significant effect from social interaction and processes for creating 
reputation than the signal (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; Podolny, 
1983; Rindova et al., 2005). A result like that might have a double interpretation: either is better 
to develop good relationships with other actors instead of to have good performance, or that the 
effect of signal is still not fully captured in research [10]. Our presumption is that the effect of 
social interaction and the signal in the market moderate the effects of changes in the allocation of 
productive assets, but the overall effects go in opposite direction. When organizations rely solely 
in social interaction and changes in their allocation of productive assets leads to less amount of 
devoted assets for the productive task, social interaction helps to moderate the effect of such 
distraction of effort; as organization is well known, these changes will not have a great impact on 
success. When organizations have sent a signal of high quality and changes in allocation of 
productive assets leads to less amount of devoted assets for the productive task, the signal would 
prevail and create an overall positive effect; therefore, 
                                                 
10 Rindova et al. (2005) recognize this possibility in their study. They consider perceived reputation as the reflection of high 
quality inputs and high quality productive assets; while there can be a consensus about value of inputs, there is low consensus 
about quality of assets, mainly if they refer to knowledge assets. 
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Hypothesis 4a: Social interaction positively moderates the effect of changes in allocation 
of productive assets, but creates an overall negative effect.  
Hypothesis 4b: Signal positively moderates the effect of changes in allocation of 
productive assets, and creates an overall positive effect.  
 
III. Data and Methods 
To accomplish our goal and test these hypotheses about an organization’s reputation we 
use a database that provides details about the performance quality of individuals, their perceived 
quality by other actors and their effect over an organization. Moreover, the ideal data should also 
cover the Podolny’s concerns (1993) about the gap between reputation and actual quality: time 
lag, stochastic process, relations within social structure and second-order nature of reputation. A 
social network of Open Source Projects could meet these requirements as long as it includes the 
nature of relationships among members, the resources provided by members, and the results 
from the interaction, over some period. Software creation through open mode of production 
involves the contributions of many individual programmers, so it is possible to measure the 
effect of individual contribution in overall reputation. Although Open Source Projects do not 
necessarily rely on contracts to hire programmers, and many of them do not seek direct 
economic rewards, projects constitute organizations in themselves. Open Source Projects fit in 
March and Simon’s (1958) definition of organizations: “systems of coordinated action among 
individuals and groups whose preferences, information, interests, or knowledge differ”.  
3.1. Data setting 
The data we use in this analysis come from the SourceForge.net Research Data 
(Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Notre Dame). 
SourceForge.net is the largest repository of open source software; it hosts over 140,000 projects 
and gathers over 1.5 million registered users. SourceForge.net belongs to OSTG, Inc, which has 
shared activity data with the University of Notre Dame for the purpose of academic research on 
Open Source Software, under the condition of sharing the data with other researchers interested 
in open source software phenomenon (Christley and Madey, 2005). 
 
Sourceforge.net as a repository has several characteristics that promote simultaneous 
production of code throughout a network. The purpose of the repository is to provide a platform 
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for software development over a worldwide web infrastructure where many individuals interact 
for knowledge exchange. They host projects and provide tools that allow asynchronous 
communication, stock people’s contribution, and screen software for redundant knowledge. 
Project creation is similar to start ups: an initiator registers the project in repository, declares 
project’s purpose, objectives, goals, target markets, technical characteristics and team workforce 
and asks for intellectual capital venturing. Then Sourceforge.net administrators authorize the 
creation of a space for hosting the project if it satisfies the main premises for the repository. 
Sourceforge.net has some parallelisms to a marketplace where projects needing intellectual 
capital meet their intellectual venture capitalists; these intellectual venture capitalists are 
programmers outside to the project who are willing to devote their effort and knowledge to 
achieve project’s goal. Once the repository hosts the project, it records and controls all activities. 
Every time there is some activity in the project, the repository electronically archives the 
information; these activities may include communications among members, forum posts, and 
more importantly, the artifacts –or modules of software code, produced by the people engaged in 
programming activities. As an important feature of a repository is to open the access to projects 
to everybody on the worldwide web, every single person, registered or not on Sourceforge.net, 
may see the project, download it, look at the code, look at the authors and contribute. The 
repository records changes in the team workforce, so it is possible to know if there are new 
members or if some of them have already quitted the project. As repository tracks all artifacts 
records, we can identify which and how often members contribute to software development into 
their projects and what extent they contribute to other projects. Particularly, our dataset is a sub-
sample of 3196 valid observations over twelve months of projects aimed at developing game 
software.  
 
To get this sample, we look at the monthly dumps of data and select all projects that 
belong to the category of GNU Public License (GPL) [11].  We restrict the sample to such a 
license to guarantee that projects were not subject to any restriction for copying, adoption and 
distribution, so all software in our sample is equally prone to reach the same audience. Then, we 
limit the sample to games in a general category. We pick this sub-sample because game software 
can achieve a mass of non-skilled persons, therefore their market is not constrained to 
programming skills and abilities of end users, as many other software projects are. Furthermore, 
                                                 
11 GPL grants the programmers and users of software the privileges or freedom to distribute and modify copies of 
the software, and transfers those privileges to further developments. 
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we restrict the sample for the projects that were alive during the whole sample; we take this 
decision because dataset classifies a project as ‘alive’ –when the repository still hosts the project 
and ‘dead’ when they quit the repository. Unfortunately, it is impossible to distinguish if the 
project has quitted the repository because it went independently, or because it moved to another 
repository; thus, their disappearance does not necessarily relate to market demands, or product 
lifecycles, but to managerial premises. Finally, we look at those projects whose information on 
downloading activity is available. As the source of information comes from relational database, 
some observations could be missing in the joining process. We follow this procedure over twelve 
months running from February 2005 to January 2006, to build an unbalanced panel with 25491 
total observations. 
3.2 Variables. 
In the Sourceforge.net setting, programmers freely contribute to one or several projects 
without receiving any compensation or salary.  Software production only requires the intellectual 
capital of programmers. Moreover, consumers do not need to pay a price for acquiring the 
software, consumers only need to browse over the available software and download the one 
according to their preferences. Particularly, we observe that in this context, higher reputation 
would lead to higher market share, rather than higher prices. Therefore, we depict our variables 
to adjust to the setting. 
 
Dependent Variable. Project success DOWNLOADS. 
We present project success as a dependent variable; for that we use number of downloads 
per month as a measure of project success. A download means one user retrieves the executable 
files of the software for her private use; thus downloads are an output measure of success or 
popularity among a mass of users. Number of downloads is consistent with the nature of a 
software game as a digital good through Internet, because downloading is the sole way to access 
it; furthermore, it is a common measure of performance in OSS (Crowston et al, 2003; Grewal et 
al., 2006).  
 
Independent Variables. 
The demand for open source game software relates to user’s individual preferences and an inference 
about the quality of the product. Our independent variables will attempt to cover the features we claim in 
the previous section as determinants of the inference of project’s reputation, and include other that 
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somewhat control for the actual quality of the project. We can disentangle project reputation from 
individual reputation as follows. 
Project’s social interaction (DEGREE) 
We use as proxy of social interaction the network degree a project has through its 
members. As any single programmer could simultaneously belong to other projects, they interact 
with other people throughout the network. Interaction serves as a social device to increase 
project reputation because it increases the visibility of the project. We denote as DEGREE the 
number of other projects to which each project connect through its member by simultaneously 
belonging to them in every period, Dj=Σ
i
Pi; where Pi is a project to which individual i belongs, 
and Dj is project J’s degree. 
Quality of productive assets (ASSETS QUALITY) 
In previous section, we claim that organizations that develop a pool of high quality 
productive assets send a signal to the market about their ability to produce high quality goods. In 
knowledge intensive economies, organization’s main productive asset is its intellectual capital 
(Powell and Snellman, 2004). We use as proxy of the pool of high quality of productive assets 
the aggregate, -current and past- individual performance on the network of all members of the 
projects.  For each period, we measure the cumulative on t number of artifacts – pieces of code 
sent to solve projects’ tasks-, a member i sent to any other projects K within the network and 
own project J, and sum over all project J‘s members, ρjt=Σ
i
 Σ
t
 ωit. Where ωit is an artifact sent 
to any project in the network by individual i in time t, and ρjt is the project J’s aggregate 
individual performance. We recognize we make a strong assumption on a linear function that 
relates all members’ contributions; nonetheless, the variable is an imperfect measure of the 
abilities that programmers have to detect and solve programming puzzles. We use ASSETS 
QUALITY as notation for Quality of productive assets. 
Changes in allocation of productive assets (COMMIT
N
) 
We want to devote attention to changes in the allocation of productive assets that may 
affect organization’s reputation. In our setting, individuals are the productive assets, and changes 
in their level of commitment towards the project represent a change in allocation of productive 
assets. In particular, we are interested in detecting whether the level of commitment of an 
individual within programming activities changes project success. All individuals member of a 
project can choose the level of engagement they commit to the project; moreover, there are no 
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punishments or explicit pressures to adopt certain level of engagement. Members can choose 
between being active contributor exclusively to the project; an active contributor to the project 
and other projects; an active contributor to other projects; and to do not contribute in any project 
at all. Here contributions refer to develop programming activities or, particularly, sending 
artifacts. We measure how many individuals fall in each category and check for changes respect 
to previous period, we denote as COMMIT
N
, where N is a particular case. We use COMMIT
1
 
when individuals move from being sole contributors to project J to contribute simultaneously to 
project J and any other project K within the network. We use COMMIT
2
 when individuals move 
from contributing to J to contribute solely to K. We use COMMIT
3
 when individuals move from 
contributing to any J or K to do not contribute at all. We use the change toward being exclusive 
programmer to J as the base for our regressions. 
Other Contributors (OTHER CONTRIBUTORS) 
We use two complementary measures to control for actual project’s quality. Even when 
the projects create broad network for social interaction, a reliable pool of productive assets, and a 
constant individual commitment towards the project, just to create reputation, there should be 
high quality products that actually sustain their reputation. A measure of project’s actual quality 
could be the interest it creates in other people outside the project within the network. A project 
receives lots of attention if other programmers start sending artifacts to its underlying code. If a 
project receives the attention of many other programmers outside its boundaries, then we expect 
it has good quality, it has interesting features, or at least relevance or value for each programmer. 
We denote OTHER CONTRIBUTORS number of outsider contributors participating in a given 
period. Outsider contributor explicitly means any single individual who sends artifacts to project 
J, when she does not appears in the front cover of the project as project member. 
Artifacts’ Growth (ARTIFACTS GROWTH) 
It is possible to measure project quality as its efficiency in data processing. For that 
purpose, we look on the number of pieces of code or artifacts that a project receives in each 
period. Project life cycle has a close relationship to the number of artifacts received in a given 
period. When a project is in its early stages, it requires a strong programming activity to develop 
its main features. As it evolves, the requirements for artifacts diminish, if software is reliable and 
efficient, as it will not have programming, or running problems. Therefore, comparing two 
projects, each of them at the same development stage, the one that requires more artifacts is more 
likely to be less efficient. However, a rough measure like this could indicate that the one 
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requiring more artifacts is more complex; therefore, we use the growth in the number of artifacts 
from one period to another. Thus, keeping stage constant, projects whose number of artifacts 
grows from period to period, have poor quality, as they need a lot of code to perform their 
activities. We denote ARTIFACTS GROWTH the difference among periods of the number of 
artifacts received by a project. 
 
Control variables 
In the present study, we have included the project’s characteristics as control variables. 
On one hand, these control variables reflect the characteristics, which may induce differences in 
dependent variable because of demographic issues, such as size and stage of a project; but also 
those referring to their technical peculiarities, which could make it more attractive for both 
programmers and users.  Our control variables include:   
Project size (SIZE) 
We consider as project size the number of members of project J, for accounting for all 
variance due to a higher number of people involved in the project. 
Project stage (STAGE) 
OSS projects included in our database are at different stages of development, going from 
planning, pre-alpha, alpha, beta, production, mature and inactive. The stage of the project and 
downloads are strongly associated. At its first stages, the core tasks relate to the creation of an 
initial system that will evolve over time, thus less demanded by users. At the last stages, the core 
task is the diffusion of the product, thus highly demanded by users. We controlled for the 
evolution as the project may require different knowledge along its stages. 
Characteristics 
We controlled for characteristics such as programming language, operating system, user 
interface, intended audience, and speaking language of the game. 
Previous project success: 
We control for the number of downloads at the previous period to take into account the 
possibility that project’s success in past period attract the attention of other users. We use the 
lagged dependent variable. 
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3.3 Method of analysis. 
In order to test our hypotheses on a dynamic approach, we use a differences-in-
differences fixed effects estimator; that is taking differences in both dependent and independent 
variables on a monthly basis, except for the COMMIT
N
 and ARTIFACTS GROWTH variables, 
that were already in that form. Therefore, we condition a variation in success at month t+1 with 
respect to month t, to a variation on reputation measures and controls at month t+1with respect 
to month t, controlling for the project’s fixed effects over the period of study. We want to 
measure how variation on reputation influences the monthly rate of downloading. The use of this 
type of regression method obeys our intention of testing how differential rates of reputation 
building strategies condition project success. The fixed effect estimator allows us to isolate the 
effect of a particular project, whose characteristics make it more attractive for programmers. The 
differences-in-differences fixed effects estimator allows us to isolate variations in dependent 
variable due to changes in independent variables conditional to the particular project’s 
characteristics, which make them more attractive for programmers. This approach is a consistent 
transformation for Pareto distributions, as is the case of our dependent variable. Figure 1a, shows 
the distribution of variable DOWNLOADS, while Figure 1a shows the distribution of the 
differences in differences transformation of DOWNLOADS.  A Pareto distribution is the 
graphical representation of what Merton (1968) defined as the “Matthew effect”: those who 
already have will be given more. In this setting, very few projects are profusely downloaded; 
meanwhile many others never attract any user. 
 
 
Figure 1. Distributions of monthly downloads, original and transformed variable. 
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IV. Results. 
Table 1 shows main descriptive statistics and Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for 
the main variables included in our analyses. Table 3 shows the results of differences-in 
differences fixed effects estimators.  Model 1 presents our base analysis, where variations in 
DOWNLOADS in previous period has a negative and significant effect in variations in 
DOWNLOADS in current period; this result appears also in all other regressions depicting a 
pattern common in experience and cultural goods, that earn most of their revenues when they 
entry on the market, but decrease over time. The significance and negative effect of the artifacts’ 
growth (ARTIFACTS GROWTH) denotes that projects that from period to period receive higher 
amounts of artifacts become less downloaded than those who receive less amounts of artifacts. 
This result reflects that keeping everything else constant, projects that still need to solve 
programming issues have low quality, as we proposed earlier. Variable’s coefficients values, 
signs, and significance remain consistent and stable throughout all regressions. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Statistics Mean Max Min Range Std. Dev. N
∆ DEGREE -0.01 39 -34 73 0.94 32263
∆ ASSETS QUALITY -0.37 158 -531 689 6.25 32263
COMMIT 1 -0.01 2 -8 10 0.14 35948
COMMIT 2 -0.03 3 -11 14 0.26 35948
COMMIT 3 0.04 14 -3 17 0.34 35948
COMMIT 1  X DEGREE t-1 -0.05 9 -224 233 2.01 35948
COMMIT 2  X DEGREE t-1 -0.08 114 -385 499 3.02 35948
COMMIT 3  X DEGREE t-1 0.17 392 -114 506 4.46 35948
COMMIT 1  X ASSETS QUALITY t-1 -0.26 618 -3632 4250 21.46 35948
COMMIT 2  X ASSETS QUALITY t-1 -0.16 494 -531 1025 8.79 35948
COMMIT 3  X ASSETS QUALITY t-1 0.57 6356 -370 6726 35.80 35948
∆ DOWNLOADS 18.15 232030 -97049 329079 2699.18 28802
∆ SIZE 0.02 24 -12 36 0.49 32263
∆ OTHER CONTRIBUTORS -0.03 357 -357 714 3.46 32263
ARTIFACTS GROWTH -0.69 1000 -3276 4276 30.97 32263
∆ STAGE 0.00 0.83 -0.83 1.67 0.02 32263
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
 
correlations
17
1 ∆ DOWNLOADS 1
2 ∆ DOWNLOADS t-1 -0.541 * 1
3 ∆ SIZE 0.016 * 0.008 1
4 ∆ OTHER CONTRIBUTORS -0.006 -0.003 -0.182 * 1
5 ARTIFACTS GROWTH -0.049 * -0.110 * -0.114 * 0.330 * 1
6 ∆ DEGREE 0.005 -0.004 0.489 * 0.004 0.102 * 1
7 ∆ ASSETS QUALITY -0.017 * -0.057 * -0.059 * 0.136 * 0.385 * 0.153 * 1
8 COMMIT 1 -0.018 * -0.033 * -0.472 * 0.202 * 0.412 * -0.098 * 0.373 * 1
9 COMMIT 2 -0.006 -0.006 -0.028 * -0.020 * 0.006 0.175 * 0.219 * 0.000 1
10 COMMIT 3 0.019 * 0.018 * 0.399 * -0.110 * -0.262 * -0.028 * -0.360 * -0.510 * -0.764 * 1
11 COMMIT 1  X DEGREE t-1 -0.003 -0.022 * -0.585 * 0.109 * 0.279 * -0.241 * 0.281 * 0.802 * 0.010 -0.443 * 1
12 COMMIT 2 X DEGREE t-1 -0.003 -0.005 -0.038 * -0.020 * 0.002 0.200 * 0.168 * 0.014 * 0.552 * -0.430 * 0.013 * 1
13 COMMIT 3  X DEGREE t-1 0.004 0.014 * 0.479 * -0.064 * -0.195 * 0.053 * -0.286 * -0.500 * -0.380 * 0.663 * -0.653 * -0.689 * 1
14 COMMIT 1  X ASSETS QUALITY t-1 0.012 * -0.024 * -0.340 * 0.149 * 0.262 * -0.119 * 0.287 * 0.566 * -0.001 -0.320 * 0.725 * 0.009 -0.520 * 1
15 COMMIT 2 X ASSETS QUALITY t-1 0.023 * -0.021 * -0.041 * -0.085 * 0.003 0.115 * 0.163 * 0.001 0.395 * -0.305 * 0.031 * 0.575 * -0.415 * -0.034 * 1
16 COMMIT 3 X ASSETS QUALITY t-1 -0.013 * 0.020 * 0.384 * -0.102 * -0.188 * 0.118 * -0.252 * -0.469 * -0.108 * 0.414 * -0.676 * -0.167 * 0.660 * -0.913 * -0.254 * 1
17 ∆ STAGE 0.017 * -0.021 * -0.028 * 0.001 0.001 -0.016 * 0.005 0.074 * -0.009 -0.022 * 0.064 * -0.003 -0.027 * 0.093 * 0.000 -0.054 * 1
* significant at 5%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
 72 
In Model 2, we have included variation in DEGREE and variation in ASSETS 
QUALITY as explanatory variables. Variation in DEGREE is positive and significant, explicitly 
when projects have increase in one more link their network degree then receive 105 more 
downloads. This result supports our Hypothesis 1, where projects that spread their reputation 
through linking to other projects receive more downloads. Variation in ASSETS QUALITY is 
also positive and significant. It means if at least one of project members sends one more artifact; 
the project receives 85 more downloads. Assets quality is the cumulative number of artifacts that 
members of a project send to own project and other projects; therefore, we might interpret 
changes in this variable as a signal of the quality of the pool of productive assets, satisfying our 
Hypothesis 2. 
 
Model 3 presents results where we have included those changes in allocation of 
productive assets, and in our setting, changes on commitment to the development of activities for 
project J; COMMIT
1
 is positive and significant, while COMMIT
3
 is also significant but 
negative. With COMMIT
1
 we found that when an individual moves from solely developing code 
to project J towards developing code also for project K, then project J receives around 612 more 
downloads respect to previous period. This particular change on commitment implies an activity 
that reinforces reputation by providing individual problem solving abilities to other projects, and 
creating a link through contribution to other projects. On the other hand, COMMIT
3
 resulted 
negative although significant at 10%. Thus when an individual moves from developing code for 
other projects K, and suddenly stop contributing to them, project J’s success decreases in 344 
downloads; it appears to be negatively regarded by peers, and could mean that when members 
project J stop submitting artifacts to other projects K then project J loses visibility. This joint 
result supports Hypothesis 3. In Model 3, we also observe that increases in size have a positive 
significant effect. 
 
Model 4 includes variation in DEGREE, variation in ASSETS QUALITY and changes in 
commitment. DEGREE and ASSETS QUALITY still present positive, significant and similar 
effects as in Model 2. Nonetheless, an organizational change in commitment (COMMIT
2
) is the 
only variable that resulted negative and significant at 10%. This result implies that when an 
individual changes from sending artifacts to both project J and other projects K, to send only to 
projects K, project J decreases in 386 downloads. These results also provide complementary 
support to our Hypothesis 3. 
 73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Differences-in-differences Fixed Effects Regression Estimates. 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ Project Success
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 )
∆ DEGREE 105.750 *** 106.253 ***
(21.950) (21.986)
∆ ASSETS QUALITY 85.230 *** 89.668 ***
(8.170) (9.116)
COMMIT 1 612.020 ** -356.243
(297.560) (315.076)
COMMIT 2 -243.150 -386.961 *
(210.170) (212.143)
COMMIT 3 -344.790 * -155.855
(196.040) (198.053)
COMMIT 1  X DEGREE t-1 -59.682
(38.611)
COMMIT 2  X DEGREE t-1 -98.388 ***
(25.443)
COMMIT 3  X DEGREE t-1 -87.310 ***
(21.207)
COMMIT 1  X ASSETS QUALITY t-1 11.426 **
(3.842)
COMMIT 2  X ASSETS QUALITY t-1 8.123 **
(3.089)
COMMIT 3  X ASSETS QUALITY t-1 7.529 ***
(2.287)
∆ DOWNLOADS
 t-1 -0.676 *** -0.674 *** -0.675 *** -0.674 *** -0.675 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ SIZE 17.260 36.300 224.080 *** 44.605 236.068 ***
(43.920) (50.070) (66.220) (70.442) (62.823)
∆ OTHER CONTRIBUTORS 3.410 6.310 6.559 5.652 11.263 **
(4.790) (4.800) (4.850) (4.871) (5.370)
ARTIFACTS GROWTH -38.760 *** -45.110 *** -39.150 *** -45.854 *** -39.581 ***
(1.530) (1.619) (1.540) (1.662) (1.583)
∆ STAGE 1174.090 1103.910 455.330 1303.345 188.945
(1113.530) (1110.150) (1133.000) (1133.220) (1158.345)
N 25491 25491 25491 25491 25491
F 679.900 588.730 579.590 512.330 447.510
p>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
rho 0.308 0.313 0.310 0.313 0.310
Standard errors in parenthesis. * sig at 10%; ** sig at 5%; *** sig at 1%
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In Model 5, we included interactions between changes in commitment, and degree in 
previous period, and changes in commitment and assets quality in previous period. Interactions 
between changes in commitment and degree in previous periods means that we considered the 
degree project J has in period t-1 and multiply by the change in commitment N, therefore its 
meaning refers to what extent changes in commitment affect downloads given the previous 
period degree of project J. When referring to the interactions between commitment and degree, 
we observe that COMMIT
2
 X DEGREE
t-1
 has a negative and significant coefficient; therefore, if 
a member of the project J changes to solely submitting artifacts to project K, given that in 
previous period had a higher degree respect to other projects, project J loses 98 downloads. 
Downloads are decreasing on previous period degree multiplied by a change in commitment.  
We obtain a similar coefficient to COMMIT
3
 X DEGREE
t-1
, where members stop sending 
artifacts completely, but project J had a certain degree in previous period. As the links measured 
by DEGREE refer only to membership and not contribution, the bonding is not tight; therefore, 
this result may imply that other people in the network would not be interested in J, given that 
their members, usually belonging to many other projects do not perform programming activities. 
This result supports Hypothesis 4a. Interactions between changes in commitment and ASSETS 
QUALITY in previous period (COMMIT
N
 X ASSETS QUALITY
t-1
 ) mean that we multiply the 
aggregate assets quality in previous period by the change in commitment N; therefore, it implies 
to what extent changes in commitment affect changes in downloads given members of project J 
achieved some aggregate quality. All three variables have positive and significant effects, 
whereas COMMIT
1
 X ASSETS QUALITY
t-1
 has a higher effect than other two.  These results 
suggest that project’s reputation remains even when individuals change their commitment; in any 
case, it is more important when individuals contribute simultaneously to project J and other 
projects K. These results support our Hypothesis 4b.  Overall, our results present in a non-
structured manner that if organizations engage in activities to sustain their reputation obtain 
greater success, providing support for our whole model. 
 
V. Conclusions, limitations and questions for future research. 
 
Creating and sustaining a reputation are not easy tasks for organizations. These processes 
require that organizations devote efforts to produce high quality goods, to create a signal that 
distinguish them from the rest of organizations in their market, to develop relations to 
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stakeholders who can endorse them, and to be aware that subtle changes in allocation of 
productive assets can affect their final reputation. In this study, we find a positive effect of 
creating links between projects through shared membership. Members of a project that also 
belong to other projects help to spread the knowledge about the project and increase its demand. 
Strength of our study is that we can actually measure how projects interrelate through their 
members; therefore, our results are quite robust. Thus, the social interaction increases demand by 
increasing of reputation. 
 
Organizations trying to differentiate from others through investment in high quality of 
productive assets will find their reward. In our particular setting, we can measure individual 
performance inside and outside the project, and finally aggregate over all members of the 
project. Project members’ abilities and skills for solving tasks even for other projects provide a 
good reference of the quality of project’s human capital. Besides, other people within the 
network can be aware about these abilities and skills. 
 
Allocation of productive assets has been always an important issue in management. We 
go further in this study by claiming that changes in this allocation could also affect 
organization’s reputation. Moreover, we find that distracting productive assets from production 
process affects final success. When an individual changes her commitment towards the project, 
and starts sending artifacts also to other projects, or resigns – in terms of activity, not in terms of 
membership- to project, then project will suffer important loses in terms of downloads. Our 
result is comparable to demand decrease due to changes in productive assets. These loses could 
be not that important if the organization procures to have strong social interaction among other 
projects, but still have a negative effect. Nonetheless, our study underlies the relevance of 
creating reputation through social interaction in order to diminish adverse effects on demand due 
to changes in productive assets. If organizations create reputation through investing in high 
quality productive assets, the story has a nicer end; changes in allocation of productive assets 
have a positive effect if the quality of productive assets increases. Signal from aggregate 
individual past performance will prevails even when some individuals change their commitment 
towards the project. Nonetheless, the effect will increase as the change goes from contributing 
exclusively to the project to contributing to also several projects. If there is a change to not 
contributing, or contributing to other projects, the signal also prevails, although its effect is 
lower. 
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In addition, we should remark, we included some proxies for actual quality of the project, 
the number of outsider contributions and artifacts growth. These controls allow us to identify the 
effect of reputation, keeping constant the quality of the project. 
 
Nonetheless, our study presents some limitations. We used the number of projects to 
which project J connects as a measure of social interaction. However, we cannot actually 
measure the quality of social interaction. Most studies in reputation through social interaction 
acknowledge that both, quality of the relationship, and quality of the partner in relationship will 
affect the level of reputation. Therefore, our measure lacks these two properties, and assigns 
equal weight to all of these relationships. Nonetheless, we find a positive effect, which can 
indicate the quality of good relationships prevails of bad relationships.  Another limitation is that 
the use of an aggregate measure of individual performance as quality of productive assets does 
not differentiate between the number of contributions and the actual quality of contributions; if 
we can weight the number by the quality then the proxy for reputation would be more accurate. 
In this sense, it would be interesting to measure the effect of disaggregate individual 
performance, because some particular individual could be leading project’s quality and utterly, 
project’s reputation.  Although organizations’ reputation is somewhat a complex task, 
recognizing its processes and mechanisms helps to develop a strategy for its creation and 
reinforcement over time. 
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Conclusions. 
 
In the first chapter, the core of our contribution relies on the measurement and 
identification of the collaborative structure – by identifying programmers’ roles and affiliations - 
for knowledge sharing and the differential effects on project success related to knowledge 
reception and provision. As our own results show, this measurement supports the generalised 
reciprocity exchange theory; therefore, with the aim of finding significant sources of social 
capital, the necessity emerges for accounting differences in investment strategies or knowledge 
exchanges that complement the stock of capital.  
 
In the second chapter, the main contribution relies in finding the effects of some 
determinants for contribution. One of the main concepts is the effect of individual signalling as 
soon as they enter into the network by contributing to the first project they subscribe. Other 
important concept is complementarities, as the willingness to contribute is increasing on the 
proportion of the categories covered by others in every project. 
 
In the third chapter, the main contribution relies in finding how changes in allocation of 
productive assets can lead to decrease in success, but degree and quality of assets help to 
diminish the perverse effect of these changes. 
 
Research in open source software helps to solve many issues addressed in management, 
and the benefits will increase as soon as information becomes richer. 
 
 
 
